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STATE INNOVATION AND PREEMPTION:
LESSONS FROM STATE CLIMATE CHANGE

EFFORTS
Alexandra B. Klass*
INTRODUCTION

Can an area of "traditional state concern" evolve into an area of
exclusive federal interest for purposes of federal preemption in the
absence of express congressional intent? How can it happen? These
are two of the fundamental questions that must be asked in
considering recent developments in state efforts to protect public
health and the environment where the federal agency with
congressionally-delegated authority does not support such state
efforts. Until now, scholars and courts have approached the
preemption issue by looking almost exclusively at the federal side of
the equation. Courts find preemption where: (1) Congress preempts
state law by stating so in express terms (express preemption); (2)
Congress and federal agencies create a federal regulatory structure
that is sufficiently comprehensive in an area where the federal
interest is so dominant that it allows the inference that Congress left
no room for supplementary state regulation (implied field
preemption); or (3) Congress has not completely displaced state
regulation in a specific area, but the state law at issue actually
conflicts with federal law either because compliance with both
federal and state law is impossible or because state law "stands as an
obstacle" to achieving the full purposes and objectives of Congress
(implied conflict preemption).' Under this framework, preemption
° Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to William
Buzbee, Daniel Farber, Robert Glicksman, Heidi Kitrosser, Bradley Karkkainen, J.B. Ruhl,
Daniel Schwarcz, and Kenneth Simons for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this
Article. I also benefited greatly from comments received at the "Frontiers of Tort Law"
conference at Loyola Law School Los Angeles in January 2008 and at a faculty workshop at the
University of Florida Levin College of Law in March 2008.
1. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)
(citing and quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984) (discussing

1653

1654

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.41:1653

can result from either congressional action or federal agency action
through duly promulgated regulations. For all three types of
preemption, courts generally apply a "presumption against
preemption" where Congress is regulating in an area of "traditional
state concern." 2 Thus, in considering preemption, courts look to
whether the area was traditionally governed by state law prior to the
federal legislation. The Supreme Court and lower courts have
applied this presumption to preserve state affirmative regulation and
state common law claims for relief in areas of public health, safety,
and environmental protection.3
In determining preemption in these cases, courts generally
consider the state regulatory landscape prior to the congressional
legislation, and then attempt to determine Congress's intent against
that historical state backdrop, as well as subsequent federal agency
action that may create a conflict between federal and state law.4 I
suggest that in areas of "traditional state concern," it is relevant to
look not only at how federal agencies have used their power to
implement congressional mandates but also what states have done
with the power Congress preserved for them. Have states remained
static or have they pursued innovative regulatory or common law
liability schemes to protect public health and the environment?
Existing jurisprudence already recognizes that the scope of
federal law is dynamic for purposes of preemption; it can change
through congressional action, but it can also change through federal
agency regulation implementing congressional purposes. I propose
three types of preemption)); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)); Fla. Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941); Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000) (discussing the three types of preemption). The concept
of federal preemption emanates from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
specifically, Article VI, Clause 2, which reads: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." See Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 712-13; see also Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding that the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws
that "interfere with, or are contrary to" federal law).
2. See Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) ("[B]ecause the States
are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action." (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996))); Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 715 (discussing the "presumption that state or local
regulation of matters related to health and safety is not invalidated under the Supremacy Clause").
3. See Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 715.
4. Id. at 717-21.
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that the same should be true for the states. In situations where states
have created innovative common law or regulatory approaches to
achieve broad congressional purposes, such dynamic state efforts
should act as a counterweight to arguments by federal agencies or
industry groups that such efforts are preempted unless and until
Congress conveys an express intent that the states have gone too far
or that federal uniformity must prevail. Such an approach can be
based on congressional intent, often expressed through statutory state
savings clauses, to allow states to assist in federal agency efforts to
meet federal objectives.
In order to better explore this proposal, I consider state common
law claims for relief and affirmative state regulation to control
greenhouse gas emissions ("GHG emissions"). I have chosen this
area as a case study for two primary reasons. First, the legitimacy of
state efforts to reduce GHG emissions is at the center of today's
debates over the role state law can and should play in the federal
framework to protect public health and the environment. This debate
is made more difficult in part because courts have been forced to
address a situation where Congress has not spoken on the issue of
preemption for decades but federal agency action and state law
developments have significantly altered the federal-state landscape.
Over the last thirty years, the federal agency with delegated authority
under the Clean Air Act, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), enacted scores of new regulations, technology-based
standards, and enforcement mechanisms to implement congressional
mandates to control air pollution. In so doing, the EPA has engaged
in significant federal regulation of air pollution-an area that was
once dominated by state common law and regulation-without the
benefit of any subsequent congressional statements on preemption to
validate any displacement of state law.
Second, just as federal agency regulation has fundamentally
changed the nature of air pollution law, the federal agency position
on whether preemption of state efforts should go beyond current
federal agency policy in areas of traditional state concern has also
changed. Today, the EPA and other federal agencies frequently
argue that the authority to control certain air pollutants (i.e., GHG
emissions) is exclusively a federal issue and that even the EPA's
authority to control GHG emissions is limited by the needs of the
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President to promote countervailing economic and foreign policy
goals.
The agency's significant departure from Congress's last
expression of intent regarding federal and state jurisdiction over air
pollution poses a difficult legal question for courts. Now, courts are
called upon in case after case to weigh that original congressional
intent against a changing federal agency position on preemption. Of
course, this change in federal agencies' position on preemption is not
limited to air pollution issues. It is also evident in recent positions
favoring preemption of state law by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"), the Consumer Product Safety Commission
("CPSC"), the National Highway
Transportation
Safety
Administration ("NHTSA"), and other federal agencies regulating in
related public health areas.'
Third, state common law and regulatory efforts to control GHG
emissions illustrate today's almost complete linkage between the
common law of torts and the regulatory state in areas of public
health, safety, and environmental protection. While law students still
study, almost exclusively, the common law in their first-year torts
courses, the reality of tort law in today's world is, of course, quite
different. The use of statutory and regulatory standards to create
duties of care for purposes of negligence per se is an early, obvious
example of how the regulatory state influences tort law. Other
examples include the recent tort reform movement for statutory caps
on certain types of damages and legislative efforts to create
regulatory compliance defenses to common law tort claims.
State common law and regulatory efforts to control GHG
emissions take this interconnectedness to a new level. States
themselves use both common law and legislative tools to achieve not
5. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 229-42 (2007) (discussing recent efforts by
federal public health and safety agencies to preempt state regulations and common law claims for
relief through express statements in federal regulations) [hereinafter Sharkey, Preemption by
Preamble]; see also WILLIAM FUNK ET AL., THE TRUTH ABOUT TORTS: USING AGENCY

PREEMPTION TO UNDERCUT CONSUMER HEALTH AND SAFETY 704 (2007) (discussing regulatory
efforts by the FDA, NHTSA, and CPSC to preempt state tort law claims against product
manufacturers); Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of
Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L., Dec. 2006, at art. 5
(arguing in favor of FDA preemption of common law claims); Richard A. Nagareda, FDA
Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L., Dec. 2006, at art. 4
(discussing recent FDA regulatory actions intended to preempt state tort law claims against drug

manufacturers).
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only state and federal goals for limiting air pollution but also the
basic tort law goals of compensation and deterrence. Thus, the study
of preemption in the context of state efforts to control GHG
emissions brings together many of the fundamental issues facing
state legislatures, Congress, and the courts in reconciling traditional
tort law with today's regulatory state.6
In Part I, I review recent Supreme Court preemption decisions in
the areas of public health and environmental protection to establish
the legal principles that exist today to guide lower courts' efforts to
define the boundaries of federal and state influence in these areas of
law. In Part II, I introduce an alternate approach to analyzing
preemption claims in areas of traditional state concern. This
approach takes into account federal agency action to implement
congressional public health and environmental protection goals, but
it also places significant weight on innovative state efforts to achieve
those same goals. In Part III, I briefly trace the congressional
language on preemption and preservation of state law in the Clean
Air Act ("CAA"), with a particular emphasis on those provisions that
relate to today's debates over state efforts to reduce GHG emissions.
I then discuss recent developments in the EPA's position on
preemption of state efforts to control GHG emissions and judicial
efforts to apply current preemption doctrine in this area of law. I
conclude in this Part that courts have reached widely varying results
in these cases, in part because the existing jurisprudential framework
they have to work with does not sufficiently weigh postcongressional state action when it considers post-congressional
federal agency action. I also conclude that the Supreme Court's
2007

decision

in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection

Agency,7

although not a preemption case, supports the idea that state
innovation should be relevant in the preemption analysis. Finally, in
Part IV, I discuss the justifications for allowing state innovation to
''count" in the preemption analysis in the context of state efforts to

6. See, e.g., JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS

xix, 33, 325, 1020 (2004) (discussing negligence per se, the post-New Deal emergence of the
modem administrative state, and statutory tort reform, as part of the body of tort law that "exists
within a vastly more complex regulatory state that devotes substantial effort to promoting safety
and to providing for citizens' welfare").
7. 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
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control GHG emissions and also explain how this approach might
apply in related areas of "traditional state concern."
I. PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST PREEMPTION AND DEFINING SPHERES OF
INFLUENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT

The doctrine of preemption is based in the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, which provides that the Constitution and U.S.
laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land" notwithstanding any
state law to the contrary This Part reviews selected Supreme Court
preemption decisions involving public health and the environment
with an eye toward how the Court has addressed the growth of the
federal regulatory state and the Court's deference (or lack thereof) to
the federal agency view of preemption of state law. As many
scholars have noted, the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence
is often inconsistent and does not lend itself to easy application.'
Within this scholarship, there has been much debate over whether a
"presumption against preemption" of state law still exists in areas of
traditional state concern.'" Based on the Supreme Court's most
recent decisions in cases involving public health and the
8. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,152
(1982) (stating that preemption doctrine "has its roots in the Supremacy Clause"); Chi. & N.W.
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (attributing the "underlying
rationale of the pre-emption doctrine" to the Supremacy Clause); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (holding that the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that
"interfere with, or are contrary to" federal law); Nelson, supra note 1,at 234 (stating that virtually
all commentators have acknowledged that "the Supremacy Clause is the reason that valid federal
statutes trump state law").
9. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 14.4, at 896 (2005) (stating the
preemption doctrine continues to "wallow in a state of utter chaos"); Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing
the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000) ("Notwithstanding its repeated claims to
the contrary, the Supreme Court's numerous preemption cases follow no predictable
jurisprudential or analytical pattern."); Nelson, supra note 1, at 232 (stating that "[mjodern
preemption jurisprudence is a muddle" both as applied to discrete areas of law and in general).
10. See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV.

967, 971 (2002) (arguing that if there ever was a presumption against preemption of state law, the
Court has replaced it with an unstated presumption in favor of preemption of state law); Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative

Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 61 (2007) (stating that while the Court "continues to recite the
conventional bromide" that there is a presumption against preemption, the Court has often
abandoned this principle in practice); Calvin Massey, "Joltin' Joe Has Left and Gone Away":
The Vanishing PresumptionAgainst Preemption, 66 ALB. L. REV. 759, 759 (2003) (presumption

against preemption has no force).
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environment, there continues to be much disagreement on the Court
over the force of the presumption, particularly in cases of express
preemption.
Indeed, it is more difficult today for the Supreme Court and
lower courts to apply a presumption against preemption-or more
generally, any preemption jurisprudence-in areas where the lack of
congressional expressions of preemptive intent have been
significantly eclipsed by the growth of the federal regulatory state
and aggressive federal agency statements in favor of preemption.
Against this current backdrop, a primary question the Court
considers in many of these cases is whether federal regulatory
developments within the states' "traditional" spheres of influence can
fundamentally alter state authority that existed at the time of the
congressional enactment. In confronting this issue, however, the
Court has so far failed to address whether state law developmentsnot just federal law developments-can also be relevant to the
preemption analysis.
The primary cases which lay the foundation for this discussion
are Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,"
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,"2 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Committee, 3 Bates v. Dow AgroSciences, LLC, 4 and Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc. 5 Although these cases each build on the Court's
broader preemption jurisprudence in matters of public health, safety,
and the environment, 6 I focus on the cited cases to identify existing
11. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
12. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
13. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
14. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
15. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
16. Other Supreme Court cases have addressed important aspects of preemption of state law
in the areas of public health, safety, and environmental protection and serve as precedent to one
or more of the cases discussed in this section. See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S.
51, 70 (2002) (holding that the Federal Boat Safety Act did not expressly or impliedly preempt
common law claims for damages against a boat manufacturer for the failure to equip a boat
engine with a propeller guard); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000)
(holding that the Department of Transportation safety standard enacted pursuant to the federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which provided auto manufacturers with a choice of safety restraints,
preempted common law tort claims for design defects); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 520-24 (1992) (holding that the provision in the federal Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act prohibiting state law "requirements" or "prohibitions" based on smoking and health
with respect to advertisement or promotion of cigarettes could act to preempt state common law
tort actions against cigarette companies, in addition to preempting affirmative state regulation);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257-58 (1984) (holding that the federal Atomic
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judicial principles that may assist in creating a framework that gives
"credit" to state efforts to innovate in an area of traditional state
concern when faced with federal agency statements arguing for
preemption of state law. These cases, however, are hardly the final
word from the Supreme Court, which has heard four separate cases
this term and last term involving the preemption of consumer state
law damage claims arising out of the use of prescription drugs and
medical devices." As a result, the review below of the Court's
existing jurisprudence on federal preemption of the states' interests
in protecting public health and the environment is only a starting
point.
Despite uncertainty regarding the Court's next move, the
existing case law, as shown below, supports a few tentative
conclusions relevant to efforts to count state innovation in the
preemption analysis. First, the presumption against preemption of
Energy Act did not preempt state awards of punitive damages against a nuclear plant for exposure
to plutonium on grounds that the federal law regulated the overall safety aspects of nuclear
materials but did not displace state tort law). For recent scholarship discussing the Court's
preemption jurisprudence in the areas of public health, safety, environmental protection, see
David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); William W. Buzbee,
Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1547 (2007); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281 (2003); Dinh, supra note 9; Howard L. Dorfman et al., Presumption of
Innocence: FDA's Authority to Regulate the Specifics of PrescriptionDrug Labeling and the
Preemption Debate, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585 (2006); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The
Normalization of Product Preemption Doctrine, 57 ALA. L. REV. 725 (2006); Robert L.
Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of
Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719 (2006) [hereinafter Glicksman,
Cooperative to Inoperative]; Robert L. Glicksman, Nothing Is Real: Protectingthe Regulatory
Void Through FederalPreemption by Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 5 (2008); Michael D. Green
& William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J.
2119 (2000); Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147 (2000); Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing
Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000); Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble,supra note
5; Paul S. Weiland, Federaland State Preemption of EnvironmentalLaw: A CriticalAnalysis, 24
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237 (2000).
17. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (affirming, by an equally
divided Court, a lower court decision finding no preemption of fraud exception to state statutory
regulatory compliance defense for drug manufacturers); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999
(2008) (holding that the FDA's pre-market approval process established federal requirements that
preempt state law product liability claims against a medical device manufacturer); Altria Group,
Inc. v. Good, 128 S. Ct. 1119, 2008 WL 161478 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2008) (granting certiorari to
review the preemption of claims under state deceptive trade practices law against a cigarette
manufacturer); Wyeth v. Levine, 128 S. Ct. 1118, 2008 WL 161474 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2008)
(granting certiorari to review the preemption of state law product liability claims against a
prescription drug manufacturer).
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state law is still used (if not always applied uniformly) in many cases
involving public health and environmental protection. Second,
federal agency regulation can, but need not, preempt state law.
Third, agency positions on preemption of state law are extremely
influential although not always dispositive. These conclusions are
summarized here to set the stage for the idea that the Court's
precedent allows room for courts to weigh innovative state law
efforts to protect human health and the environment beyond federal
In many cases,
agency standards in the preemption analysis.
emphasis on state innovation may create a better and more
contemporary framework for analysis than the historic presumption
against preemption of state law.
A. Implied Preemptionand the Growth of the FederalRegulatory
State: Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories and
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee
It was in 1985 that the Court squarely addressed how much the
growth of the federal regulatory state on its own should impact
preemption of state law in areas of traditional state concern. In
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,the Court
held that FDA regulations establishing minimum standards for the
collection of blood plasma did not preempt a county's local
ordinances governing blood plasma centers within the county under
either implied field preemption or implied conflict preemption. 8 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the presumption against
preemption because the county ordinances addressed a matter of
health and safety, which falls under the "historic police powers of the
State," 9 and such powers were not to be superseded by federal law
unless that was the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress."20 The
Court fully recognized that federal agency regulations can preempt
state law just as easily as federal statutes but that the mere
comprehensiveness of the federal regulations did not result in
Even though the regulations had broadened
preemption.'
18. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985). Express
preemption was not an issue in the case. See id. at 712-13 (focusing on implied preemption
arguments).
19. Id. at 715 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 713, 717.
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significantly since 1973, the FDA had not indicated that its original
position rejecting preemption had changed, and even if the agency
had expressed an intent to preempt, the comprehensiveness of the
regulations still would not justify preemption." The Court found that
"merely because the federal provisions were sufficiently
comprehensive to meet the need identified by Congress did not mean
that States and localities were barred from identifying additional
needs or imposing further requirements in the field."23
The Court also noted that it was even more reluctant to infer
preemption from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations than
from the comprehensiveness of statutes.24 To infer preemption
whenever a federal agency deals with a problem comprehensively
would mean that "whenever a federal agency decides to step into a
field, its regulations will be exclusive." 5 The Court rejected such a
rule on grounds that it would "be inconsistent with the federal-state
balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence."26 The
Court found this to be particularly true in light of "the presumption
that state and local regulation related to matters of health and safety
can normally coexist with federal regulations."27 Thus, the Court
"will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal
regulations, an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to
health and safety."28
In Hillsborough, the Court made clear that simply because an
agency regulates broadly under its delegated powers does not mean
that the federal interest identified by Congress expands or becomes
exclusive at the expense of the corresponding state interest in
protecting public health and safety. 9 Instead, in the absence of
congressional intent to the contrary, federal agencies can regulate to
implement congressional mandates, while states can continue to
exercise their own influence in that same area of law.3" Thus, the
22. Id. at 716-18.
23. Id. at 717.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (stating that the "mere volume and complexity" of federal regulations will not result
in the inference that the federal agency intended to preempt state law).
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at718.
Id.
See id. at 717.
See id.
at 718.
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importance of Hillsborough for present purposes is its focus on

defining the federal interest and the relationship between that federal
interest and the state interest, both as that relationship existed prior to
the congressional action as well as after comprehensive federal
regulation in the area.
Any harmony Hillsborough created between a growing federal
regulatory structure and areas of traditional state concern has become
tempered, however, by the Court's later willingness to carve out
"exclusive" spheres of federal interests. Once a federal interest
becomes completely separated from what may have been a
traditional area of state law in the past, any presumption against
preemption disappears. This is precisely what the Court did in 2001
in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee.3

In Buckman, the

plaintiff sued a regulatory consultant to a manufacturer of orthopedic
bone screws, alleging that the FDA would never have approved use
of the bone screws in the absence of fraudulent representations by
the consultant.32 The plaintiff included a state common law
misrepresentation claim entitled "fraud-on-the-FDA," which alleged
the defendant made specific fraudulent representations to the agency
during the device approval process.33 In reversing the Third Circuit's
rejection of a preemption defense, the Court carved out an
"exclusive" federal interest when it considered the consultant's
implied preemption defense.34 Rather than describing the case as one
involving the state's traditional interest in protecting the health and
safety of its citizens, the Court defined the case as one involving
"[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies," which is "hardly 'a field
which the States have traditionally occupied."' 35
The Court proceeded to focus on the "delicate balance" between
federal statutory objectives to deter fraud and the burdens placed on
regulated parties. 6 The Court feared in particular that "complying
31. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
32. Id. at 343.
33. Id. at 346-47; see also In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817,
821-22 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing the elements of the plaintiff's fraud-on-the-FDA claim), rev 'd
sub nom. Buckman, 531 U.S. 341.
34. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352 (pointing to clear evidence that "Congress intended that the
MDA [Medical Device Act] be enforced exclusively by the Federal Government" (citing 21
U.S.C. § 337(a) (2002)).
35. Id. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
36. Id. at 348.
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with the FDA's detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of fifty
States' tort regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing
potential applicants" and that Congress had not contemplated such
burdens in enacting the medical device provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").37
Buckman shows what can happen when a federal interest is
defined in a manner that allows it to be divorced from the historic
state interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens. In such a case, the federal regulatory state preempts parallel
or overlapping state authority (e.g., common law fraud claims) in
areas of traditional state concern.38 Moreover, Buckman reveals the
beginning of an FDA position in favor of preemption that is broad
enough to cover not only state actions that interfere with the defined
federal interest but even those actions that would provide only an
additional remedy for an already-determined federal violation.39
Indeed, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion, the
FDA's position in the case was not only that the federal agency
should have exclusive jurisdiction to make the initial fraud
determination but that consumers should not even be able to use state
law to obtain damages in cases where the FDA had already made the
fraud determination.4" According to Justice Stevens, a plaintiff
should be able to bring a state law claim for damages based on a
prior FDA finding of fraud because, in such a case, state law would
be providing solely a remedy for an existing federal violation, rather
than interfering with the federal interest in balancing deterrence of
fraud against reducing burdens on the agency and regulated parties.41
Buckman thus stands as an example of the Court allowing federal
agency action to create an exclusive federal sphere of influence that
prevents the parallel or overlapping influence of state law. As
discussed later, this federal-agency-created tension between federal
and state interests has become even more acute today in the areas of
public health and the environment.
37. Id. at 350; see also Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (granting
certiorari to address split in the circuits over whether the fraud exception to a Michigan statute
granting immunity to drug manufacturers is subject to preemption but affirming by an equally
divided court the lower court decision finding no preemption).
38. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353.
39. Id. at 354 (Stevens, J., concurring).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Buckman, along with Hillsborough, shows the Court attempting
to balance the impact of the growth of the federal regulatory state as
well as the views of the federal agency in the context of implied
preemption. In both cases, Congress had given no clear statement of
intent to preempt state law, and many years had passed since
Congress had spoken on the issue at all.42 In the interim, the federal
agency had significantly expanded its influence, and in Buckman,
expressed a position in favor of preemption of state law.43
B. Express Preemption and the PresumptionAgainst Preemption:
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, and
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
Despite the protests of some Justices, the Court has applied the
presumption against preemption of state law in areas of traditional
state concern in at least some cases of express, as well as implied,
preemption. In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, a plurality of the Court
rejected the argument that the FDA regulations creating a
streamlined approval process for certain medical devices (the
§510(k) process) preempted state common law claims for damages
against the medical device manufacturer." Unlike Hillsborough and
Buckman, which involved implied preemption, the issue before the
Court in Medtronic was the interpretation of express congressional
language in the federal Medical Device Act ("MDA"), §360(k),
prohibiting state "requirements" for medical devices that were
"different from, or in addition to" any federal "requirement" or
"which relate[] to the safety or effectiveness of the device."45

42. Not only do the prescription drug provisions of the FDCA contain no preemption clause,
but the 1962 amendments to the FDCA provide: "Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as invalidating any provision of
State law which would be valid in the absence of such amendments unless there is a direct and
positive conflict between such amendments and such provision of state law." Drug Amendments
of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962).
43. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353.
44. 518 U.S. 470, 501-02 (1996).
45. The precise statutory language stated: "Except as provided . . .no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for
human use any requirement--(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of
the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this
chapter." Id. at 481-82 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000)).
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Despite the fact that the Court was interpreting an express
statutory preemption clause, it still applied a strong presumption
against preemption of state law.46 First, the federal law was in
"matters of health and safety," which are within the historic police
powers of the states.47 Second, the federal law did not create an
express or implied private cause of action against manufacturers.48
The Court found it "difficult to believe that Congress would, without
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by
illegal conduct. 49
The Court thus interpreted the historic state "field" in which
Congress was regulating quite broadly (health and safety) and then
interpreted the preemptive scope of the statutory term "requirements"
fairly narrowly. As a result, the statutory provision preempted only
state affirmative regulations or common law claims that conflicted
with federal device-specific requirements. Because the FDA had not
promulgated such device-specific requirements through the §510k
process, state law damage claims relating to the device did not
As in
necessarily conflict with any federal requirements."
Hillsborough, the Court also relied on the FDA's statements in its
regulations that the statutory preemption clause did not preempt state
or local requirements of general applicability, but instead preempted
only state or local requirements that established a substantial
requirement for a specific device.5 1 The Court concluded that state
law damage claims could in some cases be "requirements" that are
preempted under the MDA but that such a finding would be rare and
did not occur in this case. 2
The dissent, by contrast, argued that state damage claims did
impose "requirements" under the MDA. It disagreed with the
46. Id. at 485.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 487.
49. Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
50. See id. at 493-94.
51. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 499-500 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995)).
52. Id. at 502-03. In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer disagreed with the conclusion
that it would be rare for the MDA to preempt state law claims for damages and gave an example
where a jury would hold, based on expert testimony, that a 2-inch wire was required for a hearing
aid component where the federal regulation had required a 1-inch wire. Id. at 504. In such a
case, Justice Breyer would find that the state law claim was preempted. He agreed in this case,
however, that the federal agency position arguing against preemption was subject to deference
and that the preemptive scope of §360k should be interpreted narrowly. Id. at 508.
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plurality's narrow reading of the exclusive federal interest at stake as
well as its interpretation of the MDA's preemption clause. 3
In defining the federal interest, the dissent focused on the
"extensive federal manufacturing and labeling requirements" the
FDA had created under the MDA.5 4 Because of the comprehensive
federal regulations "relating to every aspect of the devicemanufacturing process," the dissent would not require Congress to be
any more explicit than it was in §360k to preempt state law claims
for damages. 5
Thus, a fundamental difference between the majority and the
dissent was in defining the scope of the exclusive federal interest and
the specificity with which Congress must legislate in order to
preempt a traditional area of state law. The majority applied a
presumption against preemption and required specific language by
Congress to preempt common law claims for damages in areas of
traditional state concern. The dissent focused on the broad scope of
the federal interest expressed by the comprehensiveness of the
federal regulations and, without any presumption against preemption,
did not require Congress to legislate with specificity to preempt state
law damage claims. Once again, however, the FDA's position on
preemption favored allowing state law damage claims, providing
support for the plurality's decision. 6
The issue of the scope of federal authority versus state authority
was also center stage in the Court's 2005 case of Bates v. Dow
Bates dealt with whether an express
AgroSciences LLC 57
preemption provision in the federal pesticide law preempted state
statutory and common law claims for damages by peanut farmers
against a pesticide manufacturer. 8 The federal pesticide law, known
as "FIFRA," contains an express preemption clause providing that
states "shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for
labeling or packaging [of pesticides] in addition to or different from

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 509-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.at513-14.
Id.
Id. at 498-99.
544 U.S. 431 (2005).

58. Id. at 434.
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those required under this subchapter."59 At issue was whether the
plaintiffs' claims for damages under state law were "requirements for
labeling or packaging."6 The Court held that merely because a jury
verdict against the defendant might motivate "an optional decision"
on the part of the manufacturer to change the pesticide label did not
mean such a verdict would be a "requirement" subject to express
preemption. 1
In reaching this decision, the Court once again applied the
presumption against preemption, defined the historic state field in
which Congress was regulating broadly, and defined the exclusive
federal interest narrowly. 62 The Court noted that when Congress
created the modem version of the federal pesticide law in 1972,
courts had entertained tort litigation against pesticide manufacturers
for many decades.63 The Court then focused on the continuing role
states played in regulating pesticide sales and application in their
jurisdictions, drew attention to their role as "independent sovereigns
in our federal system," and applied the presumption against
preemption in "areas of traditional state regulation.

' 64

In particular,

the Court relied on the "long history of tort litigation against
manufacturers of poisonous substances" to "add[] force to the basic
presumption against pre-emption."65

In its prior cases involving the FDA, the Court had bolstered
similar conclusions with reference to the delegated federal agency's
view that the state laws or claims at issue were not preempted.66 In
Bates, however, the EPA had changed its longstanding position
against preemption and argued for preemption of state law on
59. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000). FIFRA stands for the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y.
60. Bates, 544 U.S. at 443-44 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000)).
61. Id. at 445.
62. Id. at 449 (stating that even if the defendant's reading of the express preemption clause
was plausible, "we would nevertheless have a duty to accept the reading that disfavors preemption"). In a partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
objected to the majority's use of a presumption against preemption in a case of express
preemption (as opposed to implied preemption) and also argued that the history of state tort
litigation against manufacturers should be irrelevant to the Court's preemption analysis. See id. at
457-58 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 440-41, 449-50.
64. Id. at 449.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 489-500 (1996); Hillsborough County
v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1985).
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grounds that such state law claims would allow juries in fifty states
to establish "a crazy-quilt of anti-misbranding requirements different
from the one defined by FIFRA itself and intended by Congress to be
interpreted authoritatively by EPA. ' '67 The Court rejected the EPA's

position based on the presumption against preemption, the historic
role of state law in areas of safety and the environment, and the fact
that the EPA's position was contrary to the position it had advocated
only five years prior to the case.68
In Bates, like in Hillsborough and Medtronic (and unlike in

Buckman), the Court defined the state interest broadly and the
exclusive federal interest narrowly. The state's interest was to
protect the public health and safety of its citizens. The federal
interest was not the regulation of pesticides generally, but ensuring a
uniform program of required labeling of pesticides. Thus, the law
allowed ample room for state law to create damage remedies for
violations of federal labeling requirements or new causes of action
for violation of express warranty, fraud, or other violations not
specifically tied to required labeling language.
The Court's
definition of the relevant state and federal interests, along with the
presumption against preemption, prevailed over the EPA's own
attempts to define the exclusive federal interest more broadly.
This expansive view of the role of state tort law in express
preemption cases ground to a halt, however, when the Court decided
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.69 in 2008. In Riegel, the Court returned to

the express preemption provision of the MDA (also at issue in
Medtronic v. Lohr) but here in the context of whether the plaintiff
could sue in state tort law for injuries resulting from a medical device
approved not under the 510(k) process but under the much more
stringent premarket approach process for Class III devices." In
finding the plaintiffs claims preempted, Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, focused extensively on the rigorous premarket approval
process, the extensive amounts of time the FDA spends reviewing
each application, and the post-approval monitoring and reporting

67. Bates, 544 U.S. at 448 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 16,Bates, 544 U.S. 431 (No. 03-

388)).
68. Id. at 449.
69. 128 S.Ct. 999 (2008).
70. Riegel, 128 S.Ct. at 1005-06.
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requirements placed on regulated parties.7' The Court held that
unlike the 510(k) process at issue in Lohr, the premarket approval
process here had set federal, device-specific requirements under the
MDA.7" The Court then went on to hold that the plaintiffs state
common law tort claims were "requirements" that were different
from those set under federal law, thus running afoul of the MDA's
express preemption provision.73
Notably, throughout the opinion, the focus was on the presentday pervasiveness of federal regulation governing medical devices
and the fact that state tort law "disrupts" the federal scheme in this
area.74 The Court made no mention of any presumption against
preemption of state law and rejected the idea that its interpretation of
the term "requirements" in the express preemption clause should be
narrow simply because Congress was aware of the pervasive use of
state tort law against medical devices but yet did not express any
intent to preempt such claims specifically.75
It is only in Justice Ginsburg's dissent that there is a discussion
of medical device regulation as "a domain historically occupied by
state law" prior to the MDA.76 In her view, it was error to interpret
the term "requirements" in the MDA to include state common law
tort claims because, in fact, Congress enacted the MDA against the
backdrop of numerous, high profile lawsuits against manufacturers
of medical devices that highlighted the need for federal regulation in
the area.77 Because California and other states had enacted their own
premarket approval processes to fill the regulatory void prior to the
MDA, Congress's preemption of state "requirements" was focused
on replacing such state approval processes with a unified, federal
approval system and did not contemplate any preemption of state tort
law.78 Justice Ginsburg found "informative the absence of any sign

71. Id. at 1003-05.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1007.
1007-08.
1003-05, 1008.
1008-09.

76. Id. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1013, 1018.
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of a legislative design to preempt state common-law tort actions"
given Congress's awareness of these state lawsuits.79
Unlike in Lohr and Bates where the Court focused on the
important and continuing role of state tort law and allowed federal
and state law to co-exist, in Riegel, state tort law is nothing more
than a disruptive force that interferes with the FDA's regulatory
authority. The majority opinion did not acknowledge that state law
had any legitimate role to play, and the Court rejected state tort law
as anything other than a conflicting "regulation" that must stand
aside for an expanded federal interest. Thus, Riegel shows how
defining the scope of the federal interest and the state interest is
critically important not only in cases of implied preemption but also
as a foundation upon which the Court decides cases of express
preemption.
C. Summary
A review of this selection of the Court's recent preemption cases
involving public health and environmental protection matters allows
for at least a few tentative conclusions. First, the Court has applied a
presumption against preemption of state law in the areas of public
health and environmental protection in cases involving both express
and implied preemption. Second, the Court has recognized that
agency regulation can preempt state law. Third, federal agency
enactment of a large volume of complex regulations over a period of
years or decades after the original charge from Congress does not on
its own transform an area of traditional state concern into one
dominated by exclusive federal interests, although, as seen in
Buckman and Riegel, it can certainly serve to expand the federal
interest in that area. Fourth, agency statements of intent to preempt
(or lack of intent to preempt) are important but not always
dispositive. ° Fifth, arguments attempting to carve out exclusive
spheres of federal interest are possible but have so far been limited.
One fundamental problem in attempting to reconcile these cases is

79. Id. at 1013 (stating that MDA's preemption provision responded to state regulation, and
particularly California's system of premarket approval for medical devices, by preempting such
state regulation absent FDA permission).
80. But see Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449 (2008) (discussing the emphasis the Supreme Court
places on agency views regarding federal preemption of state law).
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that, in many instances, the Court is attempting to determine
congressional intent that was expressed (if at all) decades ago and
did not contemplate many of today's conflicts between federal and
state law over the issues of most concern today. Part II discusses this
and other problems with current preemption doctrine and introduces
a framework to begin to address these problems.
II. INTRODUCING A PREEMPTION DOCTRINE THAT WEIGHS POSTCONGRESSIONAL STATE INNOVATION ALONG WITH POST-

CONGRESSIONAL FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION

This Part first sets forth the problems with current preemption
doctrine in areas of traditional state concern, focusing on the inability
of the courts to fully acknowledge the inherent interrelationship
between state and federal law in today's regulatory state. Next, it
explains precisely what should "count" as state innovation and why
state innovative action should be given weight in analyzing claims of
both implied and express preemption. Thus, this Part lays the
groundwork for the analytical framework that will be applied in later
Parts to state efforts to control GHG emissions and to other areas of
traditional state concern.
A. The Problem with CurrentPreemptionDoctrine
An assessment of the Supreme Court's preemption
jurisprudence reveals an unstated assumption that state law is
primarily a static force in the Court's preemption analysis. The
Court, by contrast, readily acknowledges that federal law can change
through agency action and, in particular, expand to displace state
law.8' In reaching decisions on preemption, the Court first examines
the congressional language (or lack thereof) on preemption and then
the federal structure the delegated agency has created since receiving
its authority and what influence that federal structure should have on
state law.
State action is considered only for purposes of
determining whether it conflicts with federal law as shaped by
federal agency action. Courts generally recite the presumption
against preemption of state law in "areas of traditional state concern"
but do not consider the possibility that innovative state action should
"count" in assessing whether federal agency action can displace it.
81. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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The question that arises in attempting to count state innovation

in the preemption analysis is whether the Supremacy Clause allows
such a factor to be part of the equation. The Court has held that,
ultimately, it is up to Congress to determine when it wishes to
displace state law and when it wishes to allow federal law and state

law to coexist. Where Congress has created a broad state savings
clause (as it often does when it regulates in areas of "traditional state
concern"), not only can it be said that Congress wishes to leave state

law alone but also that Congress wants to recruit state law to assist in
This intent appears to be
achieving federal policy goals.82
particularly true in areas of environmental protection, public health,

safety, and consumer issues, where both regulators and the regulated
community have now spent several decades being aware of, and
responsive to, a cohesive framework of both state and federal law.
Viewed this way, placing greater weight on state initiatives that
occur after Congress has spoken through legislative action is
consistent with congressional intent as well as the Supremacy

Clause.
One might argue that state action subsequent to congressional
action should not "count" because all that matters is the intent of

Congress, and it is the federal agencies with congressionallydelegated authority, not the states, that are charged with carrying out
the intent of Congress. Indeed, it is this special role played by
federal agencies in implementing congressional intent that is the
basis for the significant deference the courts are required to give
agencies' interpretation of federal statutes under Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 3 and Skidmore v.

Swift & Co.84 Therefore, federal agencies can reduce the room left
82. See Bates, 544 U.S. at 450-51 (examining express preemption clause and savings clause
in federal pesticide law to conclude that the statute "authorizes a relatively decentralized scheme
that preserves a broad role for state regulation" and creates "concurrent authority of the Federal
and State Governments"); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 70 (2002) (stating that
while Congress expressed an interest in uniformity through its preemption clause in the Federal
Boat Safety Act, that interest cannot defeat the law's broad savings clause for state law);
Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 717, 721 (stating that the structure of the Public Health Service Act did
not bar states and localities from "identifying additional needs or imposing further requirements"
and, in fact, "contemplated additional state and local requirements"); Hills, supra note 10, at 5657.
83. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
84. 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see also Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 737 (2004) (discussing the tension between the Chevron doctrine and the presumption
against preemption of state law where the federal agency interprets a statute in favor of
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for states through their regulations, and there is nothing states can do
about it. Such an approach, however, allows federal agency intent to
substitute for congressional intent on preemption."
By failing to
expressly preempt state law (or doing so only very narrowly),
particularly in areas of public health, safety, and environmental
protection, Congress has not only delegated authority to federal
agencies to act but also allowed and encouraged state actors to
pursue congressional goals using both traditional and innovative
regulations and common law theories.86 Both sides of the equation
are dynamic, and by ignoring state innovation, courts are depriving
states of the ability to use the space for regulatory and common law
change Congress left for them to implement.
During the rise of the federal regulatory state, this issue tended
to lurk in the background as states and private parties relied on the
new tools Congress and the federal agencies had created for the
regulation and enforcement of public health and environmental
matters.87 Now, however, the federal regulatory state often appears
to be contracting rather than expanding. Instead of new regulations
and new technology standards, we are in an era of federal
deregulation as the agencies in the public health and environmental
protection arena attempt to ease the regulatory burdens on industry,
provide more products to consumers, place fewer burdens on the
economy, and deal with significant cuts in federal enforcement
budgets.88 At the same time, states are attempting to fill the gap
preemption of state law); Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble,supra note 5, at 243-47 (discussing
the Chevron doctrine in context of recent agency arguments in favor of preemption of state law);
infra note 102 (citing cases where courts have struggled balancing deference to federal agency
positions in favor of preemption of state law with the presumption against preemption of state
law).
85. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) ("Agencies may play the
sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself."); Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra
note 5, at 228 (discussing "[flederal agency momentum towards increased preemption" by using
examples of the FDA, CPSC, and NHTSA, and comparing these agencies' "recent aggressive
stances" to their "more mixed-and often muted-preemption positions" in the past).
86. See Hills, supra note 10, at 56. "Congress routinely legislates against a background of
state laws that it does not intend to disturb" and it "implicitly enlists state law to serve federal
ends, by operating on the tacit understanding that state and federal rules dovetail into a single
scheme." Id.
87. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the
Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REv. 545, 566-76 (2007) (discussing the rise of the regulatory state
in environmental law).
88. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 130 (2d Cir. 2006) (Pooler, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that preemption of common law tort claims against
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created by federal deregulation by setting stricter emission standards
for automobiles and industries to control GHG emissions, in addition
to bringing common law nuisance suits against power plants and
automobile manufacturers.89 In other areas of the law, such as
products liability, consumers rely on common law damage claims to
obtain relief from harmful prescription drugs and medical devices,
while scholars, the public, and the courts express growing concern
that the FDA, the CPSC, and other federal regulators are neither

medical device manufacturers and other product manufacturers will "undoubtedly reduce the
resources expended on safety related innovations that would benefit consumers," and such a
reduction of state resources is a problem in light of the "influence of the regulated industry" over
the FDA, along with inadequate agency resources to genuinely ensure that devices are safe when
approved and are properly reevaluated when new information becomes available), aff'd, 128 S.
Ct. 999 (2008); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
("[L]awyers and their clients often find themselves serving as drug safety researchers of last
resort."); Perry v. Novartis Pharma. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 687 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (refusing to
find that the federal prescription drug law preempts state common law tort claims, citing "the
recent concerns about the effectiveness of the FDA's safety monitoring of recently approved
drugs," and finding that "the availability of state law tort suits provides an important backstop to
the federal regulatory scheme"); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 115 (2005) ("It is a common view that during the past five years the
environmental zeal of the federal executive branch has waned, resulting in fewer new or
strengthened laws, fewer strengthened regulations, and less federal enforcement than one would
have expected in a more pro-environment administration."); David A. Kessler & David C.
Vladek, A CriticalExamination of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96
GEO. L.J. 461, 465 (stating that the FDA's pro-preemption position is inconsistent with the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and is based on an unrealistic assessment of the agency's ability to
police the adverse effects of drugs after the approval process is complete); Anne Erikson Haffner,
Comment, The Increasing Necessity of the Tort System in Effective Drug Regulation in a
ChangingRegulatory Landscape, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 365, 379-87 (2006) (discussing
"industry-friendly" changes in the FDA drug approval process and oversight process that has
reduced FDA authority over drug manufacturers and led to an increase of unsafe drugs on the
market); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 587, 601-07
(2005) (discussing problems with FDA oversight of prescription drugs and stating that "the FDA
does not have the capability-or, some charge, the motivation-to analyze thoroughly and act
swiftly upon all the information that it does receive"); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Failing in Drug
Safety, OfficialAsserts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004, at 11 (discussing the congressional testimony
of an FDA reviewer from its office of safety research who stated that federal drug regulators are
incapable of protecting the public from unsafe drugs); Stephen Labaton & Ron Nixon, OSHA
Leaves Worker Safety Largely in Hands of Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at Al (reporting
that since 2000, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has issued the
fewest significant standards in its history, and has expressed a preference against regulations in
favor of a "voluntary compliance strategy" allowing industry associations and companies to
police themselves); Eric Lipton, Safety Agency Faces Scrutiny Amid Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 2007, at 1 (Sept. 2, 2007) (discussing budget cutbacks, political pressure, and the current
administration's "deregulatory agenda" as reasons why the CPSC is ineffective in protecting
consumers from harmful products).
89. See infra Part III.B.
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motivated nor equipped to adequately regulate these industries.9" In
response, many federal agencies have taken the position (with some
success) that state regulations and common law claims are preempted
because we have, in essence, crossed the divide beyond which
federal uniformity must prevail over more protective state regulation
or common law.
One can certainly chalk up this shift to politics as usual-federal
agencies are merely pursuing a political agenda that is friendly to
industry interests. Dismissing the shift as merely political, however,
ignores the question of how state and federal goals can and should
overlap, particularly when so much has changed in the many decades
that have passed since Congress spoke on the issue. Even if there
ever were clear "boundaries" dividing the federal and state spheres of
influence, it is overly simplistic today to attempt to draw those lines
in modem preemption analysis and allow dynamic movement only
on the federal side. Roderick Hills has argued that "[a]s federal and
state laws become more intertwined, it becomes less plausible to say
that federal law is preserving state law's independent scope and more
plausible to say that federal law is effectively deputizing the states to
fill gaps in federal statutes."'" It is this real linkage between state and
federal law in fulfilling congressional objectives that argues for a
new approach to the role of state law in the preemption analysis.
B. Counting State Innovation in the PreemptionAnalysis

In order to consider giving weight to state innovation in the
preemption analysis in areas of traditional state concern, it is first
necessary to identify when states are being innovative. For purposes
of the analysis below, I define state innovation as legislative or
common law actions by states (not merely citizens of states) to
implement congressional goals (e.g., reducing air pollutants or
protecting consumers from unsafe drugs, medical devices, or
products) that differ from federal agency policy but do not conflict
with minimum federal standards or preclude compliance with federal
standards.
90. See supra note 91and accompanying text (citing articles and cases discussing the failure
of federal agencies to effectively police drug, medical device, and other consumer product
manufacturers, as well as the need for state common law claims to fill federal gaps in
enforcement and encourage industry compliance with health and safety standards).
91. Hills, supra note 10, at 56-57.
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Thus, state regulations or common law claims brought by state
attorneys general to limit air pollution, as well as state lawsuits or
regulation in other public health areas (such as relating to
prescription drugs or medical devices), would count as state
innovation. By contrast, private party common law or statutory
claims to obtain injunctive relief or damages from air pollution or
harm arising from the use of products or prescription drugs would
not count as state innovation. In such private party actions, the
existing presumption against preemption of state law in areas of
traditional state concern would apply, but there would be no
additional weight against preemption. As explained in subsequent
Parts, recent Supreme Court pronouncements, along with other
authority, support a special rule for states acting in their sovereign
capacity. In other cases, the current presumption against preemption
of state law, along with other scholars' recent suggestions to better
define those presumptions, should suffice for current purposes.92
The question then arises whether states can "innovate" in ways
that are both more protective and less protective than federal
standards. The answer to that question depends in large part on the
precise federal statute that governs the area in which states are
attempting to innovate. With regard to air pollution, water pollution,
or other areas governed by federal environmental laws, state
innovation generally can be more, but not less, protective than
federal standards or provide an alternative path to achieving federal
standards. This is because most federal environmental legislation
expressly sets a "regulatory floor" that prohibits states from enacting
or enforcing standards that are less protective than federal
standards.93 In this circumstance, state innovation would include

92. See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 16 (creating a presumption against preemption
of state law that operates differently based on whether the issue is pending before Congress, a
court, or an administrative agency and proposing that Congress adopt a new drafting principle
that contains a presumption against federal regulatory "ceilings"); Hills, supra note 10, at 54-61
(proposing that courts apply a presumption against preemption of state law based on a Chevronstyle deference to state laws threatened with preemption) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (instructing federal courts to defer to a
federal agency's interpretation of a federal statute when the statutory language is ambiguous and
the agency's interpretation of the statute is permissible or reasonable)).
93. See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing CAA); ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 103-04 (5th ed.

2006) (discussing Congress's establishment of federal minimum, but not maximum, standards in
numerous federal environmental laws).
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state standards that are more protective than federal standards and
that allow industry to achieve or exceed compliance with federal
standards using methods that differ from federal standards. It would
also include legal actions by state attorneys general using state tort
law to achieve levels of compliance not required by federal law.
Outside the area of environmental law, however, the situation
may be different. Congress has done much more to set uniform
standards for nationwide products (such as drugs and medical
devices) than it has in regulating individual power plants and other
industrial facilities.94 As a result, the states have historically had less
authority to set regulations governing the labeling and distribution of
products that may harm public health and the environment. In this
area then, the focus often turns from state regulation to state tort law.
For the most part, Congress has not set a "floor" for the level of
protection states must give to their citizens to recover for injury, and
so state legislatures are free to innovate not only by increasing
protections for their citizens but also by decreasing those protections.
States have engaged in this type of innovation in recent years
through various types of "tort reform" that include limiting liability,
punitive damages, or noneconomic damages in suits against doctors
or product manufacturers.95 In these circumstances, states need to be
concerned primarily with limits contained in their state constitutions,
rather than limits imposed by federal law.
Such state legislative action that arguably reduces protection
from harm can thus "count" as state innovation for present purposes.
State action that increases protection from harm (through state
legislation creating enhanced rights of action or enhanced damages,
or actions taken by state attorneys general on behalf of state citizens)
also counts as state innovation. Such experimentation would not
94. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case
of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1507-09 (2007) (noting that the economic case for
federal preemption is strongest when states engage in regulation that is likely to interfere with the
national distribution of uniform products and lowest when states merely regulate "end-of-pipe
pollution").
95. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5) (West 2008) (adopting blanket immunity for drug
manufacturers based on federal regulatory compliance with exceptions to such immunity if the
defendant has deceived or defrauded the FDA); Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and
Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 98-99 (2007) (discussing state tort reform efforts);
Catherine M. Sharkey, The FraudCaveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REv. 841 (2008)
(discussing Michigan and other statutory schemes granting immunity from liability or from
punitive damages for compliance with FDA requirements).
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raise preemption concerns (even if it might raise other concerns)
unless Congress chooses to set minimum or maximum standards in
that area. Thus, states can innovate in the area of products liability in
ways that are either more, or less, protective than federal standards

and with arguably more freedom than exists in the area of
environmental law.
The next issue is whether state innovation should count in both
express and implied preemption cases. I suggest that it should,
despite the fact that courts must conduct different analyses for the
two types of preemption claims. In deciding implied preemption
claims, particularly implied conflict preemption claims,9 6 courts must

determine whether the state law at issue actually conflicts with
federal law, either because compliance with both federal and state
law is impossible or because state law "stands as an obstacle" to
achieving the full purposes and objectives of Congress.97 In such an

analysis, federal agency action already counts, and state innovation
can and should count. Particularly when it has been decades since
Congress set forth its statutory goals and issued statements (if any)
on the continuing role of state law (such as is the case with the Clean

Air Act amendments of the 1970s and congressional legislation in
the prescription drug area and other public health areas),9" the courts'
focus is often on whether state law conflicts not with congressional

action, but with federal agency regulations and current federal
agency positions on preemption.9 9
96. There has been less focus on implied field preemption in the Court's recent cases
involving public health and the environment probably because of the fact that public health and
environmental protection are areas of traditional state concern where Congress is less likely to
expressly or impliedly preempt the field.
97. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
98. Although Congress recently amended the FDCA by enacting the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, the only preemption language in those amendments
precludes states and political subdivisions from establishing requirements for the registration of
clinical trials or for the inclusion of information relating to the results of clinical trials in a
database. See Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
99. See, e.g., Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 1:04-cv-1748-DFH-WTL, 2007 WL
2726259, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 19, 2007) (noting that courts considering the issue have generally
continued to allow common law failure-to-warn claims against drug manufacturers to proceed
despite the FDA preemption preamble but finding conflict preemption in cases where the FDA
had specifically considered and rejected the warning the plaintiff alleged should have been
given); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 787 (E.D. La. 2007) (granting no
deference to the FDA position and finding no preemption of state tort law); Sarli v. Mylan Bertek
Pharms., Inc., No. 1:07CV43, 2007 WL 2111577 (M.D.N.C. July 19, 2007); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 273-78 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding the FDA position on
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As the Court noted in Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc., 00 extensive federal regulations enacted

pursuant to a federal statute can, but need not, preempt state law,
particularly where federal, state, and local regulation can continue to

coexist in areas of public health, safety, and other areas of traditional
state concern.'' Thus, for implied preemption claims, the focus is
often on whether federal activity that has occurred after the
congressional enactment has created a conflict between federal and
state law. In such an analysis, it is appropriate not only to look at
federal action and federal positions on preemption but also at state

actions and whether those state actions attempt to be innovative in an
effort to meet congressional public health and environmental
protection goals. In such a situation, innovative state regulatory or
common law efforts that are consistent with congressional goals (i.e.,
to protect human health and the environment through controlling air
pollution or, as in Hillsborough, creating standards for the collection

of blood plasma from donors) can and should count to offset industry
and/or federal agency claims of preemption. As shown above, such
an approach can be supported by a view of state savings clauses in
preemption entitled to no deference, finding no clear statement by Congress that it intended to
preempt state tort law, and finding no actual conflict between plaintiffs' claims and federal law);
Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Perry v. Novartis Pharm.
Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 686-87 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating that the FDA position cannot
substitute for lack of clear congressional statement preempting state tort law and finding state law
claims not preempted); McNellis ex rel DeAngelis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286(JBS), 2006
WL 2819046 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006), rev'd Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir.
2008); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. M: 05-1699
CRB, 2006 WL 2374742 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006); Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964,
968-69 (D. Neb. 2006) (finding FDA drug labeling requirement does not preempt state law
failure to warn claim); Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(giving deference to the FDA position in preamble and finding FDCA impliedly preempted state
common law failure to warn claims), aff'd Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.521 F.3d 253; Levine v.
Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006) (giving no deference to the FDA
preemption preamble and finding no conflict between state and federal law that required
preemption of state failure to warn claim against prescription drug manufacturer), cert. granted,
128 S. Ct. 1118 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2008); Peters v. Astrazeneca, LP, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056
(W.D. Wis. 2006) (finding no preemption of state law claim against drug manufacturer in the
absence of record evidence that the FDA had actually considered and rejected the additional
warning on the drug and that the FDA had determined including such warning would be false and
misleading); Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 5 (discussing the impact of federal
health agency positions on preemption); see also infra notes 155-158 and accompanying text
(discussing courts' focus on agency positions on preemption with regard to state regulation of
GHG emissions).
100. 471 U.S. 707, 713-18 (1985).
101. Id.
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federal legislation that is based on an implied delegation of authority
to the states in addition to the express direction to leave existing state
law in place.
A similar approach can apply to cases of express preemption. In
deciding express preemption claims, the issue is whether a more
expansive or less expansive interpretation of the express preemption
clause is consistent not only with the language of the statute but also
with the overall purpose of the statute. For instance, in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr,0 2 the Court stated that its goal was to interpret the
precise language of the statutory preemption provision with reference
to "'the domain expressly pre-empted' by that language.""3' '

The

Court then proceeded to interpret the scope of the express
preemption clause based on the structure and purpose of the statute
and the presumption against preemption of state law in areas of
traditional state concern. °4 Likewise, in Bates v. Dow AgroSciences
LLC, ' 5 the Court's focus was on the precise language of the federal
pesticide law's express preemption provision against a backdrop of
"[t]he long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of
poisonous substances."'0 6 Thus, courts in express preemption cases
start with the language of the express preemption clause, but when
that fails to resolve the issue (as was the case in Medtronic and
Bates), courts turn not only to subsequent agency action but also to
the overall purpose of the statute, which generally has left some
room for state law-the question being how much.
In each case, so long as the express preemption clause does not
clearly apply to the state action at issue, a court must ask whether
Congress would have wanted to oust or preserve state action if it had
known at that time that state innovation might conflict with federal
agency action or position on preemption. So long as the answer is
not clear on the face of the statute, state innovation should act as an
offset to federal agency arguments in favor of preemption based on
the important role state and federal law can play in implementing
congressional public health and environmental protection goals.
102. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
103. Id. at 484-85 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting
Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992)).
104. Id. at 484-86.
105. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
106. Id. at 449.
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With this preemption framework in place, the next Part
examines state efforts to control GHG emissions and whether state
innovation can and should count in resolving preemption claims.
This study reveals the shortcomings of current preemption doctrine
in attempting to resolve state and federal conflicts in contemporary
efforts to address one of today's most pressing public health and
environmental issues. In exploring this issue, what becomes clear is
that the idea of separate and independent "spheres" of state and
federal influence no longer accurately describes (if it ever did) the
federal-state relationship in addressing modem tort law and
regulatory problems.

III. THE CLEAN AIR ACT, COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, CLIMATE
CHANGE, AND THE GROWTH OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE

Beginning in the 1970s, Congress enacted sweeping legislation
regulating air pollution, water pollution, pesticides, hazardous waste,
and other environmental matters. 11 7 At that same time, President
Nixon created the EPA to implement congressional environmental
mandates through federal regulatory and enforcement actions." 8 In
the enabling laws, Congress set forth savings clauses and preemption
provisions that have for the most part not changed in over thirty
years. The brief summary below of the key congressional statements
(and silences) on preemption in the regulation of air pollution is the
starting point for the analysis of the development of the federal-state
relationship over state efforts to control GHG emissions that follows.
As this Part shows, the EPA's failure to make real efforts to limit
GHG emissions under the CAA has created a regulatory policy void
that the states have attempted to fill in an aggressive and innovative
manner. More and more frequently, courts are called upon to
determine what limits the Supremacy Clause should place on these
state efforts based on the structure and overall purpose of the CAA
and the expressions of congressional intent that exist regarding the
state and federal roles in controlling air pollution.

107. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note_93, at 90-91.
108. Id.
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A. FederalRegulation ofAir Pollution

In 1970, Congress created the first comprehensive federal
regulatory program to control ambient air emissions through major
amendments to the Clean Air Act. 9 The CAA included a charge to
the EPA, which had been created that same year, to promulgate
national air quality standards for certain pollutants, provisions to
address the reduction of emissions from new motor vehicles, and
authority for citizen suits to help enforce the requirements of the
law."'
Subsequent amendments to the CAA in 1977 and 1990
strengthened various provisions, created new programs to control
acid rain, and ratified various EPA programs."' A central focus of
the CAA is the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS"), which EPA sets to provide national uniform minimal
standards for levels of air pollutants necessary to protect public
health and welfare." 2 These minimal acceptable levels are intended
to be met through a combination of federal standards for new
stationary sources (factories, power plants, etc.) and mobile sources
(automobiles, etc.), coupled with standards contained in federally
approved state plans for existing stationary sources.'
Congressional language in the CAA regarding the basic
relationship between state and federal governments for purposes of
preemption has remained unchanged since the 1970s. Section 101 of
the CAA includes a congressional finding that air pollution
prevention and control at its source "is the primary responsibility of
States and local governments," but federal financial assistance and
leadership is "essential for the development of cooperative Federal,
State, regional, and local programs to prevent and control air
pollution.""' 4
Section 116 contains a savings clause, entitled
"Retention of State Authority." That section states that, except with
regard to preemption of certain state regulation of auto emissions,
nothing in the CAA shall deny the right of any state or political
109. See Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (1970 Amendments to CAA); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2008); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 470.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2008); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 470-75.
111. Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (1977 Amendments to CAA); Pub. L. 101-549, 104
Stat. 2399 (1990) (1990 Amendments to CAA); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 470.
112. Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2008).
113. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410-7411, 7521 (2008); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 470.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3)-(4) (2008).
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subdivision to adopt or enforce "(1) any standard or limitation
respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement
respecting control or abatement of pollution," except for standards
that fall below certain federal standards or federally approved state
implementation plans." 15 Thus, for the most part, the federal
standards are a floor, not a ceiling, for regulating air pollution.
The regulation of auto emissions is one major exception to this
general principle that states can set standards above the federal
"floor." Section 202 of the CAA authorizes the EPA Administrator
to establish standards for air pollutants from new motor vehicles that
cause or contribute to air pollution that may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 6 As for states,
Section 209 of the CAA provides that "[n]o State or political
subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles.""' 7
California, however, has a special waiver from this preemption
provision.
Section 209's waiver section allows the EPA
Administrator to waive its application to any state that adopts new
motor vehicle emission standards before March 30, 1966 (i.e.,
California) so long as the state determines that its standards will be at
least as protective as federal standards. " ' The EPA Administrator
may only refuse to grant the waiver if it finds that (1) the state
determination is "arbitrary and capricious," (2) the state does not
need special standards to meet "compelling and extraordinary
conditions," and (3) the state standards are not consistent with the
process by which EPA sets standards for auto emissions (i.e., section
7521 of the CAA)." 9 Although California is the only state entitled to
seek a waiver from section 209's prohibition on state regulation of
auto emissions, other states may adopt and enforce new auto
emission standards if they "are identical to the California standards

115. Id. § 7416.
116. Id. § 7521(a)(1).
117. Id. § 7543(a).
118. See id. § 7543(b). Another CAA provision grants California authority to set standards
for fuel and fuel additives for the purpose of controlling motor vehicle emissions. See id. §
7545(c)(4)(B) ("Any State for which application of section 7543(a) has at any time been waived
under section 7543(b) ... may at any time prescribe and enforce, for the purpose of motor vehicle
emission control, a control or prohibition respecting any fuel or fuel additive.").
119. See id. §7543(b)(1)(A)-(C).
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for which a waiver has been granted" and enacted at least two years
before the automobile model year to which they will apply. 2 °
The role of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
further complicates the federal framework regulating air emissions
from motor vehicles. While the CAA authorizes the EPA to
establish emission standards for new motor vehicles to control air
pollution, the Environmental Policy and Conservation Act
("EPCA"), enacted in 1975 in response to the 1970s energy crisis,
directs the NHTSA to establish average fuel economy standards
(known as "CAFE" standards) for an auto manufacturer's fleet of
new vehicles. 2 ' EPCA includes a preemption clause, Section 509(a),
which provides that a state may not adopt or enforce laws related to
fuel economy standards for automobiles where a federally
established fuel economy standard exists.'22
Thus, the CAA creates a framework where federal, state, local,
and regional governmental entities will work together to control air
pollution, while the federal government retains exclusive control
over setting standards for new auto emissions. However, an
exception exists where California may seek permission to set its own
standards and other states may adopt the California standards. Apart
from the auto emission provisions, this structure is typical of many
other environmental laws, such as the Clean Water Act, where
Congress has directed the EPA to work together with state and local
120. See id. § 7507. The exception was limited to California in part because it is the largest
single market for automobiles in the United States and because California already had a
regulatory framework for auto emissions control prior to the enactment of the CAA Amendments.
See Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 163 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1998); see
also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d
521, 525-28 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing in detail the CAA's motor vehicle provisions and the
California exception); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep, 508 F Supp. 2d 295, 398
(D. Vt. 2007) ("Congress has essentially designated California as a proving ground for innovation
in emission control regulations."); infra note 104 (discussing interplay between CAA, EPCA, and
California motor vehicles standards).
121. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a), (c) (2008).
122. Id. § 32919; see also Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.
Supp. 2d at 302 (holding that California regulations limiting GHG emissions from new motor
vehicles were not "related to fuel economy standards" and thus not preempted by EPCA because
the regulations "embrace much more than a simple requirement to improve fuel economy" and
because multiple approaches, with various levels of fuel economy allow compliance with the
regulations); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, No. CV F 04-6663 Awl LJO, 2007
WL 4372878, at **13-19 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007) (discussing interplay between CAA and
EPCA); infra notes 195-97 (discussing case law on preemption of California standards under
EPCA).
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governments, creating a "cooperative federalism" approach to
environmental protection. 12 3 Since the 1970 CAA Amendments, the
EPA has created a vast regulatory structure to control the emission of
air pollutants, including technological standards, health standards,
risk levels, and enforcement provisions, completely transforming
what was once the province of state law. States have subsequently
adopted and enforced federal standards and gone beyond these
standards as part of the cooperative federalism approach Congress
envisioned.'24 Despite the increasing federalization of environmental
law in general and air pollution control law in particular, courts
continue to consider air pollution regulation an area of traditional
state concern, falling under "the broad police powers of the states,
which include the power to protect the health of citizens in the
state."125
B. Climate Change and State Efforts
to Control GHG Emissions

The term "climate change" (which is often used synonymously
with the term "global warming") refers to "any significant change in
measures of climate (such as temperature, precipitation, or wind)
lasting for an extended period (decades or longer)."' 26 Climate
change is driven in part by the amount of "greenhouse gases" in the
123. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 103-04, 470-75 (describing model of
cooperative federalism and its application in the Clean Air Act); Adelman & Engel, supra note 16
(describing cooperative federalism as the "dominant model for federal environmental statutes");
Glicksman, Cooperative to Inoperative, supra note 16, at 737-44 (describing cooperative
federalism in the context of the Clean Air Act and other federal environmental statutes since the
1970s as "shared governmental responsibilities for regulating private activity" and using sections
from the Clean Air Act and other federal environmental statutes as examples of such shared
authority (citation omitted)).
124. See Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 351 ("From the beginning of federal
involvement in environmental pollution regulation, the area has been regarded as a cooperative
state federal legislative effort."); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 103-04; Klass, supra note
87, at 579-82 (discussing Congress's cooperative federalism approach to environmental law and
recent state efforts to enact innovative programs and regulations to address air pollution, water
pollution, toxic substances, right-to-know laws, remediation of contaminated property, hazardous
and solid waste, and environmental review).
125. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 217 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't. of Transp., 93 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also Engine
Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The
Clean Air Act largely preserves the traditional role of the states in preventing air pollution."
(citing Exxon Mobil Corp., 217 F.3d at 1255)).
126. EPA, Climate Change, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
basicinfo.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
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atmosphere, which include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
and fluorinated gases.127 As the Supreme Court noted in its 2007
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, when Congress enacted the 1970
CAA Amendments, "the study of climate change was in its infancy"
and the issue "went largely unmentioned" in the congressional
debates over the legislation.128 Since that time, Congress directed the
EPA in 1987 to propose a "coordinated national policy on global
climate change," and multinational scientific bodies such as the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") began to
publish comprehensive reports on the subject beginning in 1990.29
The IPCC's most recent reports have concluded that immediate
measures to control GHG emissions are necessary to avoid "severe
and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems" and that human
activity "very likely" has caused most of the rise in temperatures
since 1750."
Despite these congressional mandates and the growing body of
scientific evidence linking GHG emissions and climate change, the
EPA has so far refused to take any major action on GHG emissions
that would include mandatory caps on emissions. 3 ' Congress itself
has also so far declined to place limits on GHG emissions. Until
directed to do so by the Supreme Court in 2007, in Massachusetts v.

127. EPA, Climate Change, Emissions, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
128. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1447 & n.8 (2007).
129. Id. at 1448 (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 1455-56 (citing MacCracken Aff.
5(d)); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC"), SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2-5, 10 (2007), available at
http://ipcc-wg 1.ucar.edu/wg l/Report/AR4WGl_PrintSPM.pdf.
131. See Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as a Public Nuisance,
Symposium: Climate Change Liability and the Allocation of Risk, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77,
82-84 (2007) (describing federal government's lack of response to global warming); DeShazo &
Freeman, supra note 94 at 1517 & n.54 (describing state climate change initiatives as arising
"against the background of a relative vacuum of policy response at the federal level" and detailing
the Bush administration's policy positions on the issue); Glicksman, Cooperativeto Inoperative,
supra note 16, at 772-78 (describing failure of the federal government in general to adequately
protect the environment through enforcement of existing environmental laws and regulations and
enactment of new ones); David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of
Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1742-43 (2007) (describing federal
government's failure to take meaningful action with regard to climate change as compared to the
significant activity at the state and local levels); Danny Hakim, States Set to Sue the U.S. Over
Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at B4 (describing New York's efforts to control
GHG emissions and quoting New York Governor Eliot Spitzer with regard to these initiatives as
stating "I believe that states have to step into a void created by a failure of federal action.").
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EPA, the EPA refused to take any action that would involve

regulating GHG emissions from new motor vehicles as "air
pollutants" under the CAA.'32 The EPA justified this decision by
arguing that the CAA did not authorize EPA to issue mandatory
regulations to address global climate change and, even if it did, it
would be unwise to do so because such regulations would interfere
' 33
with the President's "'comprehensive approach' to the problem."'

This "comprehensive approach" has consisted of further research,
support for technological innovation, and the creation of other
nonregulatory programs to encourage voluntary private-sector
reductions in GHG emissions.134 Although the Supreme Court

rejected the EPA's arguments, finding the agency had authority
under the CAA to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles and

did not provide a reasonable explanation for failing to do so,'

the

EPA has yet to propose or enact any such regulations.

States and even local governments, by contrast, have actively
attempted to reduce GHG emissions.

36

In 2002, California passed

legislation which directed the California Air Resources Board
("CARB") to develop and implement standards to control GHG
emissions from new motor vehicles. 137 In 2004, CARB promulgated

thirteen regulations requiring certain levels of emission reductions
from tailpipes under a set timetable.3 8 In December 2005, California
formally requested a preemption waiver from EPA for its auto
132. 127 S. Ct. at 1450; see also sources cited supra note 131.
133. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1451 (citation omitted).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1462-63.
136. Several recent articles detail the various state and local statutory and regulatory
initiatives to control GHG emissions. See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 94, at 1521-30
(providing overview of various state initiatives); Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate
Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 54, 60-65 (2005)
[hereinafter Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change]; Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy,
A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation:
The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 579 (2008). The Pew Center on Global
Climate Change website contains a significant amount of information on state, local, and regional
efforts to control GHG emissions. See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Latest News,
http://www.pewclimate.org/what-s-being-done/
in the states/news.cfm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); see also UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION

ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("UNFCCC"), U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 50-54

(2006), availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8964l.pdf (surveying state and
regional climate change initiatives as of 2006).
137. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42823 (repealed 2008), 43018.5 (West 2008).
138. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1 (2008).
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emission regulations.'39 In December 2007, the EPA denied
California's waiver request, 4 ' after more than sixteen states had
adopted or were in the process of adopting the California standards
pending EPA's decision on the preemption waiver. 4 '
On a broader scale, California adopted a state-wide cap on GHG
emissions in 2006, setting forth a goal of reducing state emissions to
their 1990 levels by 2020, a cut of 25 percent. 4 2 Other states and
cities have also committed to various GHG emission reduction
targets and goals.'4 3 Legislatures in at least twenty-two states require
electric utilities to generate some of their energy from renewable
sources.

44

Oregon,

Washington,

New

Hampshire,

and

Massachusetts have set emission caps and created offset programs

139. 73 Fed. Reg. 12156-57 (Mar. 6, 2008) (discussing events leading up to waiver denial).
140. See id. at 12156; John M. Broder & Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Says 17 States Can't Set
Greenhouse Gas Rulesfor Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at Al (reporting on EPA's denial of
California's CAA waiver request); Letter from U.S. EPA to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of
Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007) (informing California Governor of EPA's decision to deny California waiver
request). See also infra notes 156 - 58.
141. See William H. Carlile, Arizona Proposes Emissions Regulations Modeled After
California Clean-Vehicle Rules, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP., Jan. 14, 2008, at A-8 (reporting on
Arizona Department of Environmental Quality's release of draft rules proposing to adopt
California Low Emission Vehicle program beginning with model year 2011); William H. Carlile,
New Mexico Adopts Emissions Regulations Modeled After California Clean- Vehicle Rules, BNA
DAILY ENV'T REP., Dec. 4, 2007, at A-10 (reporting that New Mexico's Environmental
Improvement Board has formally approved regulations adopting the California auto emission
standards, making it the first state in the Rocky Mountain Region to do so); Drew Douglas,
Florida Finalizes Executive Orders, Climate Agreements with Germany, U.K., BNA DAILY
ENV'T REP., July 16, 2007 (reporting that the Florida Governor Charlie Crist had signed an
executive order directing the state agency to adopt the California tailpipe emissions standards,
joining Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Washington, and Oregon which had already adopted the California
standards). The California standards may only go into effect if EPA grants a waiver under 42
U.S.C. § 7543(b), which it denied on December 19, 2007. See also Green Mountain Chrysler
Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 302-04 (D. Vt. 2007) (finding California
tailpipe emissions standards were not preempted by federal law and would be valid upon EPA's
grant of a waiver).
142. See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 38500-38599 (Deering Supp. 2008).
143. See Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change, supra note 136, at 60; Hari M. Osofsky
& Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks? Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 409 (2008) (studying efforts of Portland, Oregon and Tulsa, Oklahoma to reduce GHG
emissions within city limits and noting that on May 15, 2007, Tulsa became the 500th city to join
the U.S. Mayor's Climate Protection Agreement); THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE U.S.
MAYORS
CLIMATE
PROTECTION
AGREEMENT
(2005),
available
at
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf.
144. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 94, at 1523 (describing state programs).
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for new and existing power plants.'4 5 Delaware, New Jersey, New
York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, New
Hampshire, Maine, and Maryland are currently signatories to the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI"), which establishes
regional limits on CO 2 emissions from fossil-fuel-fired electricity
generation, and states in other regions are in the process of

establishing similar programs. 4 6 Several states (Wisconsin, Illinois,
Indiana,

Michigan,

Minnesota,

Ohio,

California,

and

New

Hampshire) have established GHG registries that encourage industry
to inventory and voluntarily reduce their emissions with the idea that

such reductions will result in the award of credits if and when
mandatory reductions are imposed by state or federal law.'47 In
addition to these regulatory initiatives, state attorneys general have

brought high-profile lawsuits against automakers and power plants
under various theories of federal or state nuisance in an effort to
reduce GHG emissions. 4 ' In this way, states have used the common
law in conjunction with state regulatory authority in an attempt to
reshape the existing structure of air pollution control in furtherance

of both state and federal air pollution control objectives. 49
145. Oregon and Washington have set emission caps and created an offset program for new
power plants while New Hampshire and Massachusetts have created similar programs for existing
power plants. See 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.29(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. § 125-0:3 (2006 &
Supp. 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 469.501 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.70.020(4) (2008).
146. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2008) (discussing the RGGI and the ten states that are currently participating). A Western
Regional Climate Action Initiative is also in the early stages of development. See DeShazo &
Freeman, supra note 94, at 1526; see also Gerald B. Silverman, New York Agencies Propose
Regulations to Implement Regional Controls on Emissions, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP., Oct. 25,
2007, at A-2 (discussing regulations proposed by two New York state agencies to implement the
RGGI in New York State which will establish a cap-and-trade program to reduce CO 2 emissions
by fossil fuel-fired power plants starting in 2009).
147. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 94, at 1527-30 (discussing various state registry
programs).
148. See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing federal public nuisance claim in action brought by California
Attorney General against auto makers for damages for creating and contributing to global
warming on political question grounds and dismissing without prejudice state public nuisance
claims); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(dismissing federal public nuisance claim by several northeastern states against electric power
plants on political question grounds); North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 486,
497 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (denying a motion to dismiss and allowing state nuisance claim to
proceed); Andrew M. Ballard, North CarolinaLawsuit Against TVA Alleges Harm from Power
Plant Emissions, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP. (2006).
149. See, e.g., Elizabeth Shogren, States Dust Off "Nuisance" Suits to Fight Pollution,
NPR.oRG, Nov. 1, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/storylstory.php?storyld=6417774
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Not surprisingly, industry and, in some cases, the federal
government, have opposed many of these state and local initiatives to
control GHG emissions. They argue that the EPA, another agency,
or the national interest in a uniform policy toward GHG emissions in
general, precludes state action. 5 ' The auto manufacturers have sued
numerous states to prevent them from applying California's more
grounds.15
on preemption
standards
emission
stringent
Significantly, the U.S. Department of Justice along with the NHTSA
have also opposed state efforts requiring more stringent standards for
motor vehicle emissions in order to control GHG emissions on
preemption grounds.152 For its part, the EPA failed to rule on
California's request for a preemption waiver under the CAA for two
years and then, after California sued the EPA to compel a decision
on the waiver request, the EPA denied the request in December
(discussing how states have used historic common law public nuisance suits as a tool to remedy
haze and global warming problems in the absence of strong federal action and that such lawsuits
could end up spurring congressional action, as happened in the 1970s and 1980s when common
law claims to recover for hazardous waste damages led to the enactment of federal Superfund
laws).
150. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1444 (2007) (rejecting EPA position that it
cannot regulate GHG emissions from automobiles under CAA and holding that its decision not to
do so was arbitrary and capricious); Broder & Barringer, supra note 140 (reporting on EPA's
refusal to grant California preemption waiver under the CAA to impose limits on GHG emissions
from motor vehicles); Glicksman, Cooperative to Inoperative, supra note 16, at 793-98
(describing efforts by EPA to bar states from adopting measures to protect air quality and other
natural resources that are more stringent than federal standards). See supra notes 141 - 44 and
accompanying text for a discussion about EPA's refusal to grant California's request for a
preemption waiver under the CAA.
151. See, e.g., Ass'n of Int'l Auto Mfrs. v. Comm'r, 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (lawsuit by
auto manufacturers challenging state's adoption of emission standards on preemption grounds);
Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 197 (2d Cir. 1998); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
N.Y. State Dep't. of Envtl. Conservation, 79 F.3d 1298, 1308 (2d Cir. 1996); Cent. Valley
Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, No. CV F 04-6663 AWl LJO, 2007 WL 4372878 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 11, 2007, as corrected Mar. 26, 2008) (lawsuit by auto dealers against California Air
Resources Board to prevent enforcement of state regulations creating GHG emission limits for
new motor vehicles); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp.
2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007) (lawsuit by auto manufacturers and auto dealers seeking to prevent
enforcement of Vermont regulations adopting California GHG emission standards for new
automobiles).
152. See 71 Fed. Reg. 17566-67 (Apr. 6, 2006) (setting forth NHTSA's position that a state
carbon dioxide emission standard that would result in requiring better fuel economy than required
under federal standards is preempted because it "would upset the efforts of NHTSA to balance
and achieve Congress's competing goals"); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Affirmance at 6, Cent. Valley Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Kenny, No. 02-16395, 2002
WL 32298119 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 2002); see also Carlson, supra note 16, at 304-05 (discussing
Justice Department position on preemption in lawsuits challenging California's low-emission and
zero-emission vehicle program).

1692

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW [Vol.41:1653
5

1 In the past, the EPA had never denied in full a California
waiver request and prior to that time has granted more than forty in
the past thirty years. 54 California and numerous other states have
petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to review the
EPA's decision. 155 These conflicts have begun to force courts to
consider how to balance state innovation to prevent air pollution and
a new federal policy of creating exclusive federal interests, all
against the backdrop of congressional intent expressed decades
before today's current air pollution challenges.

2007.

C. JudicialEfforts to Determine the Relevant Federaland State
Interests in ControllingGHG Emissions
This section examines lower courts' recent efforts to navigate
the federal-state divide in cases involving state efforts to control
GHG emissions. In recent years, numerous federal agencies that
regulate in the public health and environmental protection areas have
aggressively attempted to expand federal interests and minimize state
interests through amicus briefs and statements in federal regulations.
Catherine Sharkey documents this phenomenon of "backdoor
federalization" and "preemption by preamble" in her work. 156 As
discussed earlier in the case of GHG emissions, the EPA has so far
declined to regulate or otherwise attempt to place mandatory limits
on GHG emissions while states and local governments have greatly
expanded their efforts in that area through regulation and litigation.'57
153. See California v. EPA, No. 1:07-cv-02024-RCL (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2007); 73 Fed. Reg.
12156 (March 6, 2008) (EPA findings supporting California waiver denial); Broder & Barringer,
supra note 140 (reporting on EPA waiver denial); Carolyn Whetzel, California Sues EPA Over
Inaction on Waiver to Allow State to Regulate Vehicle Emissions, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP., Nov.
9, 2007, at A9.
154. See Laura Mahoney, California Says Denial of Waiver by EPA Would Contradict
Previous Decisions, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP., May 31, 2007, at A10. For a discussion of the
relationship between EPA's regulation of air pollution from motor vehicles and the Department
of Transportation's authority to set fuel economy standards for motor vehicles, see Massachusetts
v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1451 (2007); Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 347;
Goldstene, 2007 WL 4372878 at *1157.
155. See California v. EPA, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. Jan. 2, 2008); Carolyn Whetzel,
California, 15 Other States Seek Reversal of EPA's Decision to Deny Waiver Request, BNA
DAILY ENv'T REP., Jan. 4, 2008, at 10 [hereinafter Whetzel, 15 Other States].
156. See Samuel Issacharoff& Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53 UCLA L.
REv. 1353 (2006); Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 5; Samuel Issacharoff &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53 UCLA L. REv. 1353 (2006).
157. See supra notes 139-152 (discussing state, local and regional efforts to control GHG
emissions).
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What then, should courts do when faced with arguments that
common law nuisance claims brought by state attorneys general are
invalid on justiciability grounds or that state efforts to control GHG
emissions through innovative regulations are invalid on preemption
grounds?
This section sets the groundwork for answering those questions
by exploring how these issues have played out in the courts so far.
First, I consider lawsuits involving state-initiated common law
nuisance claims against industries emitting GHGs. Second, I
consider lawsuits involving state regulatory efforts to establish auto
emission standards more stringent than federal requirements. These
state efforts (and the courts' treatment of them) provide insight into
today's current tension over how to evaluate state affirmative efforts
(through state regulation or common law claims for relief brought by
states) to go beyond federal standards in areas that were once within
the realm of traditional state concern but have been overshadowed in
recent decades by the federal regulatory state.
In these cases, courts have little in the way of congressional
guidance to help them balance the importance of state sovereignty,
the desire to promote federal objectives, and positions of federal
agencies that have changed dramatically in recent years. In many of
these cases, courts also grapple with whether and how to apply the
traditional presumption against preemption based on the states'
history of regulating in these areas and the increasing federalization
of many of the areas of law in question. Reviewing these cases as a
whole leads to the conclusion that what states have done with their
retained power to implement congressional purposes should "count"
in the preemption analysis, just as what federal agencies do with their
delegated power already counts.
1. States As Plaintiffs: Common Law Public Nuisance Actions to
Reduce GHG Emissions
This subsection considers state efforts to limit GHG emissions
through public nuisance lawsuits against automobile manufacturers,
power plants, and other major sources of GHG emissions. In these
cases, courts so far have been mostly skeptical about states' ability to
use the common law, namely public nuisance claims, to force
reductions in GHG emissions because such efforts implicate political
questions best answered by other branches of government. Thus,
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these public nuisance cases involve not only tensions between state
governments and the EPA over how to implement the CAA but also
tensions between state governments and broader national political
interests in coordinating efforts to reduce global warming. Adding
another new variable into the legal mix, however, is the Supreme
Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. As explained
below, the Court's findings in that case on the special role granted to
states and its view of the appropriate deference to the federal agency
may have significant implications for resolving justiciability and
preemption issues in lawsuits brought by states to limit GHG
emissions.
The first case to address a public nuisance claim brought by a
state to limit GHG emissions was Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co.'58 In that case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York held in 2005 that a federal public nuisance
lawsuit by several northeastern states against coal-fired electric
power plants to enjoin the continued release of GHG emissions was
nonjusticiable because it raised political questions over how to
address global warming better addressed by the legislative and
executive branches.'59 The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention
that "theirs is a simple nuisance claim of the kind courts have
adjudicated in the past" because, unlike the prior nuisance cases cited
by the plaintiffs, "[t]he scope and magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs
seek reveals the transcendently legislative nature of this litigation."' 6 °
Because plaintiffs were asking the court to cap carbon dioxide
emissions and mandate annual reductions of an undetermined
percentage of GHG emissions, the court would be forced to identify
and balance "economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national
security interests" not appropriate for judicial determination because
these initial policy decisions must first be made by the political
branches of government.' 6
In 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California reached a similar conclusion in a case brought by the State
of California against the nation's auto manufacturers for damages
resulting from GHG emissions. In that case, California v. General
158.
159.
160.
161.

406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id.at 274.
Id. at 272.
Id. at272-74.
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Motors, Corp.,62 the court held that even though California sought

damages rather than injunctive relief, to rule on the public nuisance
claim would still require the court to balance the interests of reducing
global warming with economic and industrial developments, and that
such policy determinations should "be made by the political
branches, and not this Court."' 63 Thus, the court refused to make a
determination on California's "global warming nuisance tort" and
cited the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA"6
for the proposition that it is the political branches under the Clean
Air Act that should make "the precise initial carbon dioxide policy
determinations."' 65 The court declined to rule on California's public
nuisance claim under state law and dismissed that claim without
prejudice for it to be refiled in state court.'66
By contrast, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina held in 2006 on a motion to dismiss that North
Carolina's state public nuisance claim could proceed against the
Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") to enjoin GHG emissions from
TVA's coal-fired electric generating units in neighboring states.167 In
rejecting TVA's arguments that it should be protected by the
"discretionary function" doctrine because it is a federal governmental
agency, the court held that the "appropriate level of pollution
emissions is a matter, not for only one or two Branches, but rather
for all three Branches of government."'' 68 The court explained that
because air pollution is "one of the most notorious types of public
nuisance[s] in modem experience, '"69 rejecting a discretionary
function exemption for TVA "would not threaten the institutional
integrity of the judiciary."7'

The court also rejected TVA's

preemption arguments, citing earlier cases in which courts held state
common law nuisance suits for air pollution against public and
162. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
163. Id. at *8.
164. See infra notes 175-188_(discussing Massachusetts v. EPA).
165. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at **11-13.
166. Id. at *16.
167. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 486 (W.D.N.C.
2006).
168. Id. at 495.
169. Id. (quoting Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 (1972)).
170. Id.
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private entities were not preempted so7 long as they were brought
pursuant to the law of the source states.' '
It is clear that public nuisance claims brought by states to
address GHG emissions are in the early stages of development, and
no court of appeals, much less the Supreme Court, has yet ruled on
the propriety of such an action. There are arguments, however, that
the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA
supports a result more favorable to the states than has been achieved
so far. Although Massachusetts v. EPA involved neither a public
nuisance claim nor preemption, its conclusions are instructive in
assessing the federal-state relationship in connection with state
efforts to address air pollution in the face of federal inaction.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA argued that it did not have
authority under the CAA to regulate GHG emissions from motor
vehicles as a "pollutant."'72 Moreover, it argued that even if it had
such authority, it was within its discretion to decline to set standards
for GHG emissions because setting such standards would interfere
with the President's ability to negotiate with developing nations to
reduce emissions and, in any event, would not be a complete solution
to the problem of global warming. 173 In rejecting the EPA's
arguments, the Court first addressed whether Massachusetts and the
other nine state plaintiffs had standing to challenge the EPA's
decision not to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA. 74 In
finding that the states had standing, the Court declared that states
"are not normal litigants" for purposes of invoking federal
jurisdiction, and cited Georgia v. Tennessee Cooper Co.'

(a public

nuisance case with a state plaintiff) for the proposition that each state

171. 42 U.S.C. § 7418; North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d
486, 497 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (citing Technical Rubber Co. v. Buckeye Egg Farm, L.P., No. 2:99CV-1413, 2000 WL 782131, at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 2000)) (concluding that the CAA does not
preempt plaintiffs' state common law nuisance claims); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the
Province of Ont. v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing to Int'l Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987) for the proposition that nuisance suits are proper so long as
brought pursuant to the law of the source states); Fisher v. Perma-Fix of Dayton, Inc., No. 3:04CV-418, 2006 WL 212076, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2006); Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp., 798 F.
Supp. 1280, 1285 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (also concluding that the CAA does not preempt plaintiffs'
state common law nuisance claims).
172. 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1461-62 (2007).
173. Id. at 1462-63.
174. Id. at 1452-53.
175. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
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be stripped of
"has the last word as to whether its mountains shall
1' 76
their forests and its inhabitants shall breath pure air.'

The Court thus placed significant attention on the fact that states
as litigators, whether in litigation against private individuals, other
states, or even the federal government, are entitled to "special
solicitude.' '

77

Although the states surrendered to the federal

government certain "sovereign prerogatives" when they entered the
Union, Congress has "ordered" the EPA to protect the states by
setting air pollution emission standards from motor vehicles under
the CAA. 17 The states, in turn, have a procedural right (enhanced by
the states' "special solicitude") to challenge any failure by the EPA
based on the states' quasi-sovereign interests. 79 Moreover, the Court
rejected the argument that the EPA could decline to regulate in order
to allow the President more flexibility in foreign policy negotiations
over GHG emissions."' The Court bluntly stated that "while the
President has broad authority in foreign affairs, that authority does
not extend to the refusal to execute domestic laws."' 81
Thus, there is support in recent Supreme Court precedent for the
idea that when states act as litigants in their sovereign capacity, they
deserve special "solicitude" that can be applied broadly beyond
standing doctrine. Indeed, in his dissent Chief Justice Roberts took
Justice Stevens to task for using the Court's precedent in Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co.,"' (which did not involve Article III standing)

to support a "special" rule for state litigants attempting to establish
Article III standing in the instant case.' 83 By applying (or creating,
depending on your view) a special rule for states as litigants, the
Court laid the groundwork for this special rule to apply, not only to
standing, but also to preemption doctrine and justiciability doctrine.
In its opinion, the Court also rejected the EPA's expert agency
position on the extent of its authority to regulate GHG emissions as
176. See Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1454 (quoting Georgia, 206 U.S. at 237).
177. Id. at 1454-55.
178. Id. at 1454.
179. Id. at 1454-55.
180. Id. at 1462-63.
181. Id. at 1463.
182. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
183. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that
Georgia. drew a distinction between state and private litigants but that the distinction was made
solely as to available remedies and "had nothing to do with Article III standing").
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"pollutants" under the CAA, as well its claim that federal regulation
would interfere with the President's exclusive powers to engage in
foreign policy negotiations. 18'4

The Court noted that the EPA's

position had changed regarding its authority to regulate GHG
emissions in recent years, just as the Court had noted a similar
change in the agency position regarding preemption of state law in
Bates v. Dow AgroSciences. s5

In both cases, the Court used this

change of position as a reason to give little, if any, weight to the
EPA's position on preemption.1 6 Thus, simply because the federal
agency takes the position that its authority is limited under a statute
for which it has delegated authority does not mean that is the final
word on whether or not that authority exists. This lack of deference
to the agency's position on the scope of its own authority under
federal law would seem to apply equally to the agency's position on
the scope of state authority under federal law.
Of course, the district court in California v. General Motors
Corp.17 specifically rejected the idea that Massachusetts v. EPA

required it to give special consideration to California's public
8
nuisance claim merely because a state, California, was the plaintiff.
Instead, the court found that Massachusetts v. EPA merely granted
states special solicitude to pursue their "procedural right" through
administrative channels, namely to challenge the EPA's rejection of
their rulemaking petitions under the CAA. 9 Thus, the scope of the
impact of Massachusetts v. EPA on state public nuisance suits
remains to be seen, as these and other similar cases make their way
through the federal appellate courts.
Litigation over the use of public nuisance and other common
law claims to limit GHG emissions is at its infancy. Ultimately,
184. Id. at 1463.
185. See id. at 1449-50. In 1998, the "EPA's General Counsel, prepared a legal opinion
concluding that 'CO 2 emissions are within the scope of EPA's authority to regulate,"' that the
general counsel's successor had reiterated that opinion before a congressional committee, and that
it was not until 2003 that the EPA expressed the opinion that it did not have authority to regulate
CO 2 as a pollutant under the CAA. Id. See also Bates v. Dow AgroSciences, 544 U.S. 431, 449
(2005) ("The notion that FIFRA contains a nonambiguous command to pre-empt the types of tort
claims that parallel FIFRA's misbranding requirements is particularly dubious given that just five
years ago the United States advocated the interpretation that we adopt today." (citation omitted)).
186. See id.
187. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
188. Id. at*12.
189. Id. at*ll-12.
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federal regulation rather than state public nuisance suits undoubtedly
will be a much more effective and realistic vehicle to begin to
address the problem of GHG emissions and climate change.' 90
Nevertheless, both now in the absence of federal regulation and later,
if and when federal regulation occurs, courts should be cautious
about rejecting supplemental common law efforts under state law.
This is particularly true where the state itself is using the common
law in an innovative fashion to impose limitations on GHG
emissions or recover damages associated with harm from GHG
emissions.
2. States As Regulators: State Efforts to Use Retained Regulatory
Authority under Federal Law to Limit GHG Emissions
This subsection considers state regulatory efforts to require
reductions in GHG emissions. So far, despite the groundswell of
state and local regulatory activity, the first judicial decisions in this
area are only now being released. These cases focus primarily on
state regulation of GHG emissions for new motor vehicles.
In 2004, California adopted a comprehensive set of GHG
emission regulations for new motor vehicles effective in model year
2009. ' California applied to the EPA for a waiver of federal
preemption under the CAA in 2005, which the EPA denied on
December 19, 2007.192

Prior to that denial, however, more than

fifteen other states, 93 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7507, adopted or were
in the process of adopting the California rules. Meanwhile,
numerous automobile manufacturers challenged those rules (which
the parties assumed, for purposes of argument, would receive EPA

190. See Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
293, 332-33 (2005) ("Global warming is not going to be solved by public nuisance litigation.
This only makes it more important to redouble our efforts to consider what form a realistic
solution should take.").
191. See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295,
302 (D. Vt. 2007); supra note 141 and accompanying text.
192. See 73 Fed. Reg. 12156-57 (Mar. 6, 2008).
193. The states that have adopted or are in the process of adopting the California rules include
Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See Green
Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 302 n.5; Broder & Barringer, supra note 143; Whetzel, 15
Other States, supra note 158 (reporting on California and fifteen other states' petition for review
in 9th Circuit of EPA's denial of CAA waiver).
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approval) in two lawsuits, one filed in the District
of Vermont and
19 4
California.
of
District
Eastern
the
in
filed
other
the
In September 2007, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Vermont rejected the manufacturers' various preemption arguments
and held that the California rules would be valid if and when the
EPA granted a preemption waiver under the CAA.'95 In December
2007, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
reached the same conclusion. 91 6

The EPA's recent denial of

California's waiver request, of course, means that the fate of the
California rules will remain in limbo for some time as lawsuits over
the denial play out in the courts. 9 7 In the meantime, however, it is
instructive to consider how the Vermont and California federal
courts relied on both Massachusetts v. EPA and the role of state
innovation in reaching their conclusions on preemption.
First, on the issue of express preemption, both courts relied on
Massachusetts v. EPA to find that there was no conflict between
EPA's authority under the CAA (and consequently, California's
authority under the CAA waiver provision) to regulate GHG
emissions from new motor vehicles and NHTSA's authority under
EPCA to promote energy efficiency by setting mileage standards.'98
In reaching its conclusion, the Vermont court applied a presumption
against preemption of the state regulations because the regulation of
air pollution in general and the regulation of air pollution from
mobile sources in particular was "traditionally a state

194. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154-56 (E.D.
Cal. 2007); Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (describing procedural history of
California GHG rules and automobile manufacturers' legal challenge in Vermont federal court).
For purposes of resolving these lawsuits, all parties assumed that the EPA would grant
California's waiver request. See, e.g., Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 302 ("[T]he
Court and the parties have proceeded with this case on the assumption that EPA will grant
California's waiver application. If it does not, of course, Vermont's regulation is preempted by
the CAA's Section 209(a).").
195. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 302-03.
196. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.
197. See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text (discussing California waiver request
and EPA denial of request).
198. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 343-49 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 127
S. Ct. 1438 (2007)); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1173-75. The Vermont
federal court conducted a full preemption analysis despite its holding that the conflict raised by
the case was actually between two federal statutes-the CAA, including its waiver provision for
California, and EPCA-rather than a conflict between federal law and state law.
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'
responsibility." 99
The court ultimately found that there was no clear
evidence that Congress intended fuel economy standards under the
EPCA to trump EPA efforts or EPA-approved state efforts to reduce
air pollution from motor vehicles under the CAA."' Instead, fuel
economy standards under the EPCA must be assumed to be
established against a backdrop of valid CAA standards."' The
California federal court similarly found that Congress created the
CAA's waiver provision for California to recognize that the state had
regulated emissions from motor vehicles well before the enactment
of the CAA. Based on this history, the court found that it "must
presume that Congress did not intend that EPCA would supercede
California's exercise of its historically established police powers."202
As for implied conflict preemption, the Vermont federal court
noted that Congress allowed California to avoid preemption because
of its severe air pollution problems, because it had led the nation in
establishing motor vehicle emission control prior to the enactment of
the CAA, and because "there were potential benefits for the nation in
allowing California to continue to experiment and innovate in the
field of emissions control.""2 3 Thus, California, with its more
stringent standards has "served as a proving ground for new
technology that would later be introduced nationwide pursuant to
federal regulations,"2 4 allowing it to be a "laboratory" for motor
vehicle regulation.2 5
Finally, the court determined that the
regulation of GHG emissions from new motor vehicles cannot be
clearly categorized as an area of traditional state regulation or an area
of exclusive federal control because "[f]rom the beginning of federal
involvement in environmental pollution regulation, the area has been
regarded as a cooperative state federal legislative effort."2 6 As a

199. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 350. (citing, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA,
127 S. Ct. at 1462; H.R. REP. No. 89-899 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3608, 3612);
Glicksman, Cooperative to Inoperative, supra note 16, at 719-20.
200. 508 F. Supp. 2d at 350-54.
201. Id.
202. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep,529 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75.
203. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (citing 113 CONG. REC. 30,946
(remarks of Rep. Bell); 30,950 (remarks of Rep. Croman) (1967)).
204. Id. at 345.
205. Id. at 345 (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1090-91 (D.C.

Cir. 1996)).
206. Id. at 351.
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result, the important policy principles supporting the ability of
California to innovate in the area of controlling motor vehicle air
pollutants (and the ability of other states to follow California's lead)
counterbalanced efforts by industry to argue for an exclusive sphere
of federal control. The California federal court reached a similar
conclusion and focused on the authority of EPA (and, consequently,
the authority of California through the CAA waiver provisions) to set
"technology-forcing goals" for motor vehicle emissions standards,
even if those standards would pose a financial burden on motor
vehicle manufacturers and consumers. 7
Finally, both courts refused to invalidate the California
regulations based on "foreign policy preemption. "208

The auto

manufacturers had argued that to allow the California regulations to
go into effect would improperly interfere with the ability of the
President to negotiate with other countries over the timing and scope
of global GHG emissions reductions. 209 This argument followed the
position the EPA had taken on the issue both in a policy report and in
Massachusetts v. EPA. 1 The courts found that the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA had already rejected that argument
with regard to EPA's authority to regulate, and then proceeded to
reject that argument regarding California's authority to regulate
under the CAA waiver provisions.21'
In particular, the California federal court held that an executive
branch policy on negotiating with other nations over GHG emissions
could not interfere with "the congressionally-established pathway in
the Clean Air Act that enables California to seek and receive a
waiver of preemption" so that California and states that wish to
follow California's lead may require compliance with more
protective auto emission regulations.212 Moreover, the court found
that if states can be barred from attempting to control GHG
emissions, current state efforts to encourage the use of energy

207. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
208. Id. at 1187-89; Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 391-96;.
209. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 396; Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F.
Supp. 2d at 1187-89.
210. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1462-63 (2007) (describing EPA's arguments).
211. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 397; Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F.
Supp. 2d at 1187-89.
212. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
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efficient light bulbs, to support the installation of solar electric
panels, to grant tax rebates for hybrid cars, to require enhanced
energy efficiency in building codes, or to encourage or require other
activities that result in lower energy use would likewise constitute an
interference with the President's authority to conduct foreign
policy. 13 Instead, the court found that the California motor vehicle
emissions regulations at issue support U.S. policy because "they
provide a state economy that favors by statute such innovations as
alternative fuels, hybrid motors, and other technological approaches
to greenhouse gas reduction" recommended in U.S. policy
documents.214
The Vermont and California actions are only the most recent
efforts of auto manufacturers to use preemption doctrine to define
narrowly the role of the states in reducing GHG emissions." 5
Although the case law is in its infancy, courts may be more
comfortable upholding innovative state action within a CAA
framework than they are in upholding broad based public nuisance
claims. Indeed, the existence of the CAA framework allows courts
to make room for state law within an existing regulatory structure
established by other branches of government. This statutory and
regulatory structure allows courts to avoid worrying about exercising
their judicial powers to make critical policy decisions weighing
economic development, foreign policy, and other matters in deciding
cases involving limits on GHG emissions.
The next Part builds on these recent decisions and explores in
more detail how courts could expressly give more credit to state
innovation in the preemption analysis in a way that is based on the

213. Id. at 1188.
214. Id. at 1189.
215. See, e.g., Ass'n of Int'l Auto Mfrs. v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2000) (invalidating Massachusetts regulations purporting to adopt California auto emission
standards on grounds that Memorandum of Understanding signed by California and auto
manufacturers was not a "standard" under the CAA that could be adopted by other states); Am.
Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 197 (2d Cir. 1998) (invalidating New York's adoption
of California's zero-emission vehicles standard because it was not identical to the California
standards for which EPA had granted a waiver); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of America v. N.Y.
State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., 79 F.3d 1298, 1308 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding New York's
adoption of California's more stringent fuel standards); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 94, at
1512-13 (discussing the history of the auto industry's efforts in Congress and in the courts to
limit as much as possible the ability of states to set auto emission standards that exceed federal
standards).
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Supremacy Clause and better reflects the actual role states play in
today's federal framework governing the protection of human health
and the environment. Rather than working in a "separate sphere" of
state law, states are increasingly integrating their statutory and
common law with the ever-growing federal policy in this area.
Recognizing a dynamic state law in this way is consistent with
congressional intent and is good public policy.
IV.

WHY STATE ACTION SHOULD MATTER: ALLOWING STATES TO
IMPLEMENT CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSES DESPITE AGENCY
PREEMPTION EFFORTS

This Part first presents in more detail reasons why state action
should count in the preemption analysis, as well as why the benefits
associated with such an approach tend to outweigh the costs. It then
proceeds to explore how this proposal could apply not only to current
state efforts to control GHG emissions but also to potential state
efforts to protect public health more broadly, including in the
prescription drug and product liability areas.
A. State Innovation, CongressionalIntent,
and the Supremacy Clause
Both the Supremacy Clause and Supreme Court precedent
support a preemption jurisprudence that gives credit for state
innovation. The Supremacy Clause "requires courts to ignore state
law if (but only if) state law contradicts a valid rule established by
federal law, so that applying the state law would entail disregarding
'
This, of course, requires a determination of
the valid federal rule."216
what Congress intended when it enacted the statute at issue. Except
in cases where Congress intends to completely displace state law (by
express preemption or by occupying the field), Congress, through its
legislation, is assuming that that state law will continue to apply in
some or all areas, as determined by the language of any express
preemption clauses coupled with the creation of state savings
clauses. In creating the federal regulatory structure in a particular
area, Congress directs the delegated federal agency to implement the
statute's overall purposes as well as respond to specific issues within
the statutory mandate that may arise after the statute's enactment.

216. Nelson, supra note 1,at 234.
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For instance, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court rejected the idea
that the CAA could not be used to regulate GHG emissions simply
because Congress was not thinking specifically about GHG
emissions at the time of the statute's enactment. Instead, the Court
stated:
While the members of Congress that drafted § 202(a)(1)
might not have appreciated the possibility that burning
fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did
understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing
circumstances and scientific developments would soon
render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language of §
202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the
flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence. 7
By this language the Court was confirming that the EPA, as the
federal agency with delegated authority under the CAA, has the
power and the obligation to respond to new concerns that arise
within the scope of a congressional mandate (controlling air
pollutants).
The question then becomes whether states also have that power
through their retained authority consistent with the Supremacy
Clause. The answer is yes, so long as that authority can be grounded
in the federal enabling statute establishing the federal-state
framework. For instance, in the CAA, Congress directed the states,
along with EPA, to address the country's air pollution problems. In
doing so, Congress intended both EPA and the states to experiment
with different approaches to air pollution, even going so far as to
allow California to enact motor vehicle standards that, if approved
through the EPA waiver process, take on the authority of federal
law.218 This approach allows and even encourages a dynamic state
law that has been impliedly "deputized" to implement congressional
air pollution reduction goals. Indeed, in Central Valley ChryslerJeep, the California federal district court justified its finding of no
preemption in large part on the important role Congress had intended
for states, and particularly for California. Citing prior cases dealing
with different aspects of the motor vehicle waiver provisions, the
court found that Congress intended that California "should have the
217. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).
218. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
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'broadest possible discretion in selecting the best means to protect
the health of its citizens' and that Congress "consciously chose to
permit California to blaze its own trail with a minimum of federal
oversight."2 '9 As a result, California and any states that choose to
follow it have been an integral part of Congress's mission regarding
air pollution from the start.
While not all statutes governing public health and the
environment contain such an express statement of cooperative
federalism as exists in the CAA, state savings clauses themselves
also support a dynamic role for state law, including common law.
By failing to include express preemption clauses (or creating only
limited ones) along with broad state savings clauses, Congress can be
seen as legislating not only against a backdrop of existing state law
but also with an expectation that a dynamic state law will respond to
new concerns. For instance, Congress indicated in the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, that "[n]othing in the amendments made by this
Act ...shall be construed as invalidating any provision of State law
which would be valid in the absence of such amendments unless
there is a direct and positive conflict between such amendments and
such provision of State law."22 This expressly leaves room for all
forms of state law to govern in this area in the absence of a "direct
and positive conflict." The question then is what Congress means by
"state law" and whether that is state law only as it exists at that
moment or state law as it develops over time in response to changing
circumstances.
It does not seem too much of a stretch to maintain that Congress
is presumed to be fully aware that state statutory and common law
change over time. Indeed, any student of tort law is aware that there
have been profound changes in state product liability law (both
statutory and common law) both prior to and since Congress spoke
on the issue of the role of state law in the federal framework
governing food and drug safety in 1962. Therefore, one can
conclude that state savings clauses in federal statutes governing
public health, safety, and the environment both preserve existing
state law (to the extent allowed by Congress) and allow for that state

219. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1171 (E.D. Cal.
2007) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 606 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
220. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962).
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law to be dynamic and change over time to address new concerns. A
preemption doctrine that places express weight on state innovative
efforts to fulfill Congressional mandates in the area of public health,
safety, and environmental protection provides a more realistic and
comprehensive doctrine that reflects the relationship between state
law in areas of traditional state concern and the federal regulatory
state.
Ultimately, the federal statute itself, coupled with substantive
agency regulatory standards, will be the focal point of determining
whether the federal standards set only a floor for state action or also
a ceiling. As recent events in the area of climate change have shown,
however, federal agency action generally has not set substantive
standards, but instead only made arguments against states setting
substantive standards against the backdrop of federal agency
inaction. In such circumstances, state action that is grounded in the
federal statutes, which themselves maintain a role for state law, is
consistent with the Supremacy Clause. Moreover, in addition to its
constitutional and statutory basis, recognizing state innovation in the
preemption analysis is supported by existing case law and is good
public policy. These issues are discussed below.
B. Supportfor State Innovation in the
PreemptionAnalysis
This section discusses case law and policy principles that
support counting state innovation in the preemption analysis and
suggest ways that courts can implement such a change in a manner
that is consistent with the Supremacy Clause. These reasons include:
(1) the Court's recent decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, along with
empirical data on the Court's preemption decisions that, together,
support the idea of a special solicitude for states; (2) the important
policy developments that can occur when states act as "laboratories
of democracy;" and (3) the fact that such an approach may encourage
Congress to focus on the policy issues in question in a way that also
addresses the relationship between the federal and state government
in implementing that policy. As shown below, there are significant
benefits to allowing state innovation to count in the preemption
analysis that, on balance, outweigh the costs associated with nonuniformity.
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1. Judicial Recognition of a Special Role for States as Parties
As explained earlier, the Supreme Court has recently recognized
in Massachusettsv. EPA that states "are not normal litigants" and are
entitled to "special solicitude," particularly when they are attempting
to protect the public health of their citizens and state natural
resources.2 2 Although the Court made this statement in the context
of Article III standing, the case upon which the Court relied, Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co.,222 was a state public nuisance case, not a
standing case. Thus, the Court's recent use of this precedent
supports the idea that courts should give greater leeway to states' use
of the judicial process in general to achieve public health and
environmental protection goals.223
Notably, in 2006, Michael Greve and Jonathan Klick conducted
an empirical assessment of Supreme Court statutory preemption
decisions during most of the Rehnquist Court years (1986-2004).224
They found that "[a]ll else equal, rulings against preemption are
much more likely in cases to which the state is a party" than when
the state is not a party. 225 Although the data set was small, the
authors observed that business interests seemed to do fine against
private parties but could not "catch a break" against the states,
regardless of a state's role as petitioner or respondent.22 6 The authors
ultimately concluded that despite any pro-business tendencies of
conservative justices, "when states insist upon their right to regulate
business over and above a federal baseline, the Court will often give
them their due. 227
The Court's recent recognition in Massachusetts v. EPA of a
"special solicitude" for states in the context of standing is consistent
221. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55.
222. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
223. See Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary
Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701
(2008) ("[The Supreme Court] has historically given states preferential status in federal courts
when a state files a parens patriae suit based on the state's quasi-sovereign interest in the health
and welfare of its citizens or the natural resources of its inhabitants and territory.").
224. Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
EmpiricalAssessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43 (2006).
225. Id. at 55. State participation as an amicus did not appear to have nearly as significant an
effect on the outcome of the preemption question as did the state participation as a party to the
dispute. Id. at 69-72.
226. Id. at 67-68.
227. Id. at 68.
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with the existing data regarding the Court's preemption cases. Just
as Massachusetts v. EPA gave states "their due" in their efforts to
protect state public health and natural resources, the existing data
show the Court is attuned to similar efforts on conflicts between state
efforts to go beyond a federal baseline and arguments for federal
uniformity under the Supremacy Clause. Taken together, the Court's
existing jurisprudence and empirical data support the idea that courts
should create a preemption jurisprudence that places more express
weight on state efforts to protect the interests of their citizens and
natural resources through innovative regulatory and common law
actions. Giving extra weight to state innovation in the preemption
analysis as a doctrinal matter makes the already recognized special
status of state action an explicit rather than an implicit and haphazard
part of the analysis.
2. State Regulation as Laboratories of Democracy
When discussing legal principles based on federalism, Justice
Brandeis's famous dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann is

quoted frequently to support the idea that "[t]here must be power in
the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation, our
economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and
economic needs. 228 According to Justice Brandeis, courts should
avoid interfering with state legislative efforts so that "a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments .... ,22' This idea
that courts should allow state experimentation to help find solutions
to the difficult economic and social concerns of the day has found its
way into the Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions in
many of its most high-profile and difficult cases in recent years.
These cases include decisions on the limits of congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause, 230 limits of state authority

228. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
230. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (striking down the federal Gun-Free
School Zones Act on grounds that it exceeded Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause).
"In this circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may
perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best
solution is far from clear." Id. (citation omitted).
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"'
under the Sixth Amendment in the context of criminal sentencing,23
limits the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
places on state policies governing affirmative action and single-sex
higher education,232 and the ability of states to allow the use of
marijuana for medical purposes despite federal law to the contrary. 33
By contrast, with the exception of ERISA2 34 cases and now the
the California auto emissions cases, courts have placed little, if any,
emphasis in preemption analysis on the fact that state innovation, in
and of itself, is important. 35 Instead, preemption analysis has mostly
ignored the role of states as laboratories even though preemption
analysis in general centers on the importance of states in our
federalist system of government. This should change, and state
efforts to prevent GHG emissions show why. As has been recently
noted, "[p]erhaps more than at any time in the last thirty-five years,
the states and localities have begun to fulfill their potential as
'laboratories' of experimentation in achieving environmental

231. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (dissenting
from decision invalidating state trial court sentencing procedure on Sixth Amendment grounds).
The decision "implicates not just the collective wisdom of legislators on the other side of the
continuing dialogue over fair sentencing, but also the interest of the States to serve as laboratories
for innovation and experiment." Id. (citation omitted).
232. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (upholding Michigan Law School's
affirmative action policy, discussing alternatives to racial preferences in admissions in various
states, and suggesting that "[u]niversities in other States can and should draw on the most
promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they develop" (citation omitted)); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 601 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that majority's
decision holding same-sex military college violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment "places it beyond the power of a 'single courageous State,' not only to introduce
novel dispositions that the Court frowns upon, but to reintroduce, or indeed even adhere to,
disfavored dispositions that are centuries old" (citation omitted)).
233. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In her dissent from
the majority decision finding the federal Controlled Substances Act within Congress's Commerce
Clause authority, Justice O'Connor stated that the case "exemplifies the role of States as
laboratories" within the states' "core police powers" to define criminal law and to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens." Id. (citation omitted)).
234. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
235. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 667 n.6 (1995) (holding that Congress did not intend ERISA to block state health care
cost control, "but rather meant to encourage and rely on state experimentation like New York's");
Boyle v. Anderson, 68 F.3d 1093, 1109 (8th Cir. 1995) (using Travelers to reject expansive
interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause to avoid a result that would "preempt a state's effort
to serve as a 'laboratory of democracy' in the realm of health care"); Green Mountain Chrysler
Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 312 (D. Vt. 2007) (relying on
California's history as a "laboratory" of innovative policy in controlling new motor vehicle auto
emissions as a reason to find no preemption).
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There can be little dispute today that in the case
of efforts to prevent GHG emissions, states are undertaking
innovative regulatory and common law tort efforts to achieve
national and state-wide emissions reductions while the federal
government has done little other than create roadblocks for the states.
This is happening in a context where it has been decades since
Congress spoke on the issue of federal preemption and state reserved
authority, where federal agency action has completely transformed
the field of air pollution law, and where, in the area of GHG
emissions, there is no guidance from Congress and little action from
the EPA. In attempting any preemption analysis in this area, a legal
framework that gives weight to state innovation makes sense. This is
particularly true in the case of auto emissions, where the CAA
expressly allows only California to set standards that exceed federal
standards, thus allowing state experimentation without forcing
industry to comply with a host of different standards from different
states.23
The proposal set forth here would allow state law, along with
federal law, to be innovative and address areas not specifically
anticipated by Congress (i.e., climate change issues as part of air
pollution law) but that become necessary to meet federal and state
needs until Congress can take up the issue itself.238 While the states
do not have the status of the delegated federal agency to achieve
congressional purposes, in the absence of express preemption, one
can argue that Congress preserved a role for the states to be active,
not static, and states should be given leeway to act at least until
Congress says otherwise.
Giving states this leeway does not necessarily run afoul of the
Supremacy Clause. Congress can always take action to indicate that
it wishes to rein in the states and have a unified, federal policy on
GHG emissions emanating from the EPA and other federal agencies.
protection goals.

236. See Glicksman, Cooperative to Inoperative, supra note 16, at 720; see also Kirstin H.
Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J.
159, 182-83 (2006) ("Regulatory innovation is especially important with respect to
environmental law where the actual object of regulation-the environment-is continually
changing, in response to myriad factors, including the effects of regulation itself.") [hereinafter
Engel, Harnessingthe Benefits].
237. See Carlson, supra note 16, at 311 ("Policy experimentation by one of fifty states in the
absence of federal regulation seems an ideal way to experiment with new technology.").
238. See Hills, supra note 10, at 56-57.
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Indeed, as Roderick Hills has suggested and as is explained in more
detail below, Congress is much more likely to act and provide clarity
on these issues if courts decline to preempt state law. 239 Although
Hills's point was made in arguing for continuing to apply the
presumption against preemption of state law, it has equal force in
connection with arguing that courts should not only apply a
presumption against preemption but also consider whether states are
taking innovative actions to achieve federal goals. In this way, states
acting as "laboratories" create a forum that allows new ideas to
spread from state to state ("horizontal" policy innovation) but also
allows new ideas to spread from the states to the federal government
("vertical" policy innovation). 24" Giving states more leeway when
they are attempting to be innovative, particularly in the face of
comparative federal agency inaction, gives Congress more "material"
to work with when and if it takes up the issue itself. If, however,
state innovation is squelched through industry or federal agency
preemption arguments, not only does industry have no incentive to
bring the issue to Congress but even if Congress (or EPA) does
eventually take up the issue, there will be less data and more limited
policy options to rely upon in creating a solution.
3. Counting State Innovation May Result in Quicker Federal
Congressional Policy on New Issues and Clearer Congressional
Statements on Preemption
Allowing state innovation to act as a counterweight against
federal agency arguments in favor of preemption may, even more
than the basic presumption against preemption, result in quicker
federal policy and clearer congressional statements on preemption.
Roderick Hills has argued that courts should apply a presumption
against preemption of state law because business interests are better
able to respond to adverse preemption decisions by placing the issue
239. See id. at 1, 4, 17 (2007) (arguing that an anti-preemption rule will mobilize more
powerful business groups to place preemption issues on Congress's agenda, leading to a public
debate of the issue in the appropriate forum); see also infra note 244-246 and accompanying text.
240. See Engel, Harnessingthe Benefits, supra note 236, at 182-83 (discussing horizontal and
vertical policy innovation in environmental law); see also Adelman & Engel, supra note 16
(arguing that the current system of environmental federalism is a "dynamic one of overlapping
federal and state jurisdiction" and that such a dynamic model should be encouraged through
presumptions against preemption of state law, principles of legislative drafting against federal
preemption, and a more specific presumption against federal regulations that preclude states from
establishing more stringent standards).
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"'
on Congress's agenda.24
Congress can then have an open,
democratic debate on the issue, and a clearer statement from
Congress is more likely to result.242 If, by contrast, courts do not
apply a presumption against preemption, they are more likely to
preempt state law, a result that adversely impacts less powerful
interests, making it less likely that the issue will be placed on the
congressional agenda.243
This analysis applies not only to Hills's goal of putting
preemption issues on Congress's agenda but also to the goal of
encouraging Congress to take up difficult substantive policy issues
(such as limits on GHG emissions) in the first place. If courts
interpret the CAA and other federal legislation to preempt state
innovation in the area of controlling GHG emissions, industry has
little, if any, incentive to encourage Congress to address the issue of
whether there should be federal limits on GHG emissions. If,
however, courts allow states to regulate GHG emissions and pursue
common law claims for relief, industry has a significant incentive to
lobby for uniform federal standards (which it hopes will be less
stringent than state standards) and to attempt to obtain some level of
preemption of state law in the process. Thus, allowing state
innovation to counteract agency and industry preemption arguments
can accelerate a federal legislative response to the general policy
issue along, perhaps, with a more contemporary congressional
statement on preemption of state law than exists today in the CAA or
any other laws related to stationary source or vehicle emissions.
There is at least some evidence that this is occurring right now
in the case of GHG emissions. In late 2007, Congress made a
significant effort to take up the issue of federal limits on GHG
emissions. Although industry is lobbying heavily to achieve a bill
that favors its interests, industry is not opposed to the idea of

241.

Hills, supra note 10, at 1, 4, 17.

242. Id.
243. Id.; see also DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 94, at 1500 (arguing that "states can be
important catalysts of a federal policy response by stimulating both pro-regulatory and antiregulatory forces to appeal to the federal government for relief sooner rather than later"); E.
Donald Elliot et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985) (arguing over twenty years ago that
diverse state regulation could prompt industry to lobby for uniform federal regulation, and using
the example of industry support for federal air pollution laws in the 1970s to obtain preemption of
inconsistent and more stringent state laws).
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congressional legislation because of the mounting number of state
regulations and state-initiated lawsuits that, if successful, have the
potential to impose far more stringent and nonuniform burdens on
industry. While courts have not overwhelmingly favored the states
in their efforts, they have not shut them down either, leaving
business in a position of great uncertainty that it hopes Congress can
remedy through federal legislation.244
Moreover, giving weight to state innovation allows courts to
acknowledge explicitly the special role of states in preemption cases
in a way not possible under current doctrine. Many scholars
complain that the presumption against preemption of state law has
become virtually meaningless, even though courts continue to pay it
lip service in their opinions.2 45 Although that point is debatable, if

the presumption has indeed lost some of its meaning, it may be
because it is often overshadowed by post-congressional, federal
agency positions attempting to carve out exclusive areas of federal
interest or a failure of courts to recognize today's interrelationship
between state and federal law. To some extent, if states are acting in
areas of "traditional state concern," then it may be more difficult to
recognize that they are also helping implement congressional public
health and environmental protection goals through regulation or
litigation. If, however, courts include as part of their analysis an
additional credit for state innovation, they can value the special role
of states as policymakers and litigators and distinguish the case from
other cases of preemption involving solely private parties and/or
244. See Felicity Barringer, A Coalition for Firm Limit on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2007, at Cl (reporting the formation of a group of industry leaders seeking congressional
legislation on climate change based on concerns over stringent state regulations and the
opportunity to take advantage of a political climate at the federal level currently favorable to
business interests); Eric Lipton & Gardiner Harris, In Turnaround, Industries Seek U.S.
Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007 at Al (reporting that after years of opposing federal
regulation, some of the nation's biggest industries are pushing for congressional and federal
agency health, safety and environmental standards in large part to avoid a patchwork of more
stringent state regulations); see also DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 94, at 1509-16 (discussing
how "regulatory uncertainty, induced or exacerbated by inconsistent state activity" produces
significant industry costs which, along with other factors, "can increase the likelihood and move
up the timing of federal regulation"); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: A PublicChoice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 571-78 (2001) (discussing public
choice theories that support the idea that industry has the incentive to seek uniform, federal
legislation over more diffuse state regulation governing environmental protection issues); supra
note 246 and accompanying text (discussing claims by scholars that judicial allowance of diverse
state policy encourages powerful industry interests to lobby Congress for a national solution).
245. See supra note II and accompanying text.
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As shown earlier, the Supreme Court in
business interests.
Massachusetts v. EPA has already expressly acknowledged the
special role of states for purposes of standing, and the data on
Supreme Court decisions show that the Court is implicitly
acknowledging that role in preemption cases. Giving express weight
to state innovation in preemption cases merely makes more
transparent a shift that finds support in precedent and is good policy.
Finally, the current failure to give weight to state innovation
leads to unnecessarily strained arguments by the states to avoid
preemption. Under current law, there is an incentive for states to
assure courts that they are not using any tools beyond those that
existed prior to the congressional legislation to avoid preemption.
For instance, in both of the cases in which the lower courts dismissed
the states' public nuisance claims, the states described their claims as
"routine," "well-established," "simple," and "of the kind courts have
'
Such arguments attempt to establish that
adjudicated in the past."246
the states are acting in a "traditional" manner in areas of "traditional
state concern." The states' incentive for arguing in this fashion is
that current preemption doctrine still rests on an assumption that
federal law can expand or change while state law stays the same.
The fact that the states were actually attempting to be innovative to
reduce pollution may have detracted, rather than added, to the merits
of the claim. Indeed, once the courts rejected the idea that these
were traditional, run-of-the-mill nuisance claims, the cases were
over.
C. BroaderApplications
While the focus of this Article has been on using state efforts to
control GHG emissions to explore a new role for state innovation in
the preemption analysis, the approach developed here can apply to
other areas that involve state efforts to protect public health and the
environment. Putting aside for a moment the state environmental
protection regulations discussed in this Article, a main complement
246. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *5, *15
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (rejecting state's common law nuisance claim despite state's argument
that the claim, "although complex, is the type of case that courts routinely resolve" and that "the
legal framework for assessing global warming nuisance damages is well-established");
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing
states' common law nuisance claim and rejecting plaintiffs' arguments "why theirs is a simple
nuisance claim of the kind courts have adjudicated in the past").
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to federal regulation in the area of public health is, of course, tort
litigation by individuals against product manufacturers. Much has
been written about the benefits and detriments of tort litigation in this
area. These benefits include providing compensation to injured
plaintiffs, deterring risky conduct by product manufacturers, and
providing to the public and government regulators information about
the risks associated with products that often are not disclosed in the
federal regulatory approval or oversight process (litigation against
the tobacco companies, breast implant manufacturers, and
pharmaceutical companies are only a few examples). 47 Critics of the
tort system argue, by contrast, that allowing the tort system to play a
central role in product safety risks overdeterrence through the
creation of a system that lacks uniformity and predictability and
benefits primarily plaintiffs' lawyers.248 The argument follows that
the federal agencies with delegated congressional authority to set
health and safety standards have the scientific expertise necessary to
set product standards, and thus, compliance with such standards
should foreclose tort liability based on a regulatory compliance
defense, an express or implied preemption defense, or both.24
So where does a preemption jurisprudence that takes into
account state innovation (as defined in this Article) fit into this
debate? As an initial matter, the bulk of product liability lawsuits,
particularly those against drug and medical device manufacturers at
the center of today's debate over agency preemption of state tort
claims, do not count as state innovation at all because they are
neither state regulatory initiatives nor common law suits brought by
states.25 ° Nevertheless, states have been innovative in some areas of
product liability law and might be encouraged to be more innovative

247. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 16 (discussing compensation needs, monitoring the ethics of
business practices, and recognizing the unanticipated circumstances where the regulatory system
fails to disclose or act on critical information regarding product risks as reasons why there should
be concerns with abandoning tort law and replacing it with a regulatory expertise model); Wendy
E. Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO.
L.J. 693, 695 (2007) (arguing that in some settings, particularly those involving consumer and
health protection, "the tort system can be more effective than the regulatory system in accessing
the various types of information needed to inform regulatory decisions").
248. See Wagner, supra note 247, at 694 (citing and discussing work of Richard Epstein, Kip
Viscusi, Richard Reich, and Peter Schuck).
249. See id; Epstein, supra note 5.
250. See supra Part II.B. and accompanying text.
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in ways that benefit the public and the federal legislative process if
state innovation was given more weight in the preemption analysis.
In recent years, states have filed high-profile product liability
suits against the tobacco and lead paint industries while
municipalities have filed suits against the gun industry.
On the
regulatory side, California's Proposition 65 requires businesses to
give "clear and reasonable warning" regarding chemicals they
manufacturer, use, or sell, if the chemical is known to cause cancer
or reproductive toxicity. 2 2 The law creates a private right of action

for violation of its provisions to supplement state enforcement
efforts.253 Other states, such as Michigan, have experimented
recently with various forms of regulatory compliance defenses (with
fraud exceptions) for pharmaceutical companies in order to promote
the development of useful drugs. 254

These regulatory compliance

defenses may raise state constitutional or other concerns but likely do
not raise federal preemption concerns.
All of these initiatives are efforts by states to experiment with
tort law and product regulation to protect public health and raise the
profile of certain issues the states may believe are not being
adequately addressed by the existing federal regulatory regime.
Moreover, in all these areas, even without the express "cooperative
federalism" approach that exists in federal environmental laws,
Congress has retained a significant role for state law either through
failing to legislate in the area or by creating broad state savings
251. THOMAS 0. MCGARITY ET AL., THE TRUTH ABOUT TORTS: LAWYERS, GUNS, AND
MONEY 603 (2006) (discussing suits by municipalities against the gun industry and suits by state
attorneys general against the tobacco industry); Bob Driehaus, 6 Ohio Cities Rush to File Suits
Against Makers of Lead Paint, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at A12 (discussing public nuisance suits
by states and municipalities against paint manufacturers and state legislative efforts to limit such
suits).
252. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5-.13 (Deering Supp. 2008); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Information-ForcingEnvironmentalRegulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 871-75
(2006) (describing California Proposition 65); Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children'sHealth
Policy, and Common Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 89, 137-39 (2005) (describing
California Proposition 65).
253. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7 (Deering Supp. 2008).
254. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 2007) (adopting blanket immunity
for drug manufacturers based on federal regulatory compliance with exceptions to such immunity
if the defendant has deceived or defrauded the FDA); Catherine M. Sharkey, The FraudCaveat to
Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 841 (2008) (discussing Michigan and other statutory
schemes granting immunity from liability or from punitive damages for compliance with FDA
requirements). The Michigan law is an example of state innovation that limits rather than expands
state tort remedies.
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clauses in areas in which it has taken legislative action.2 55 Actions by
states in these areas have the potential for a far greater impact
nationally than hundreds or thousands of private tort lawsuits. It is in
fact the heightened impact of state action, as opposed to private
lawsuits, that provides some additional support for special treatment
for states in the preemption analysis. Because such state actions
make a bigger "splash" than private lawsuits, erring on the side of no
preemption may encourage Congress to take up these now highprofile issues and create federal rules (that either follow or do not
follow the state(s) lead) both with regard to substance as well as to
whether or not federal uniformity and predictability of results are
preferable to state experimentation and autonomy.
Further analysis is required to work through the specifics of the
product liability examples cited here, along with other potential
applications. For instance, there may be more powerful arguments in
favor of uniform federal standards when it comes to the labeling of
products such as drugs or pesticides that are distributed on a
nationwide basis than there are when the issue is controlling GHG
emissions, water pollution, or the release of toxic substances from
individual power plants and other industrial facilities. 56 Likewise,
state common law claims for damages or injunctive relief against
power plants or auto manufacturers may raise more concerns than
state regulation in those areas based on the structure of the CAA,
which expressly contemplates state regulation.
The reverse,
however, may be true with regard to claims against prescription drug,
medical device, or pesticide manufacturers. In those cases, the
FDCA and FIFRA arguably leave ample room for state law damages
claims (brought by private parties or the state) but do not encourage
(and, in the case of FIFRA, prohibit), certain types of affirmative
state regulation regarding labeling and other matters.257 In sum, even
within the realm of state action to protect human health and the
environment, more or less leeway for state innovation may be more
255. See supra note 44, and accompanying text (discussing lack of express preemption of
state law in FDCA).
256. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 94, at 1507-09 (noting that the economic case for
federal preemption is strongest when states engage in regulation that is likely to interfere with the
national distribution of uniform products and lowest when states merely regulate "end-of-pipe"
pollution).
257. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Bates case and express
preemption of state regulation of pesticide labeling).
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or less appropriate depending on the existing federal statutory
structure and real-world economic concerns. Apart from those real
distinctions, however, this Article attempts to at least articulate the
beginning of a more contemporary approach to federal preemption of
state law within the now ever-present federal regulatory state that
governs the protection of human health and the environment.
CONCLUSION

This Article proposes that courts should give express weight to
state innovation in deciding preemption cases. In today's regulatory
state, state law is inherently intertwined with federal law in fulfilling
congressional policy goals in a way that current preemption doctrine
does not reflect. While the presumption against preemption of state
law may have been formulated for a preemption doctrine based on
"separate spheres" of state and federal influence, an explicit role for
state innovation may allow courts to more effectively implement
congressional intent in a way that recognizes the role states play in
implementing federal laws protecting human health and the
environment. A review of recent developments in state efforts to
control GHG emissions and the response of business interests,
federal agencies, and Congress to these developments shows
granting states "special solicitude" in the preemption analysis, as has
been done in the Court's recent Article III standing analysis, is
consistent with the Supremacy Clause and may also result in better
federal policy.
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